Chen Po-ta

ON THE TEN-YEAR CIVIL WAR

(1927-1937)

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This book was written in 1944. It shows how Mao Tse-tung used Marxist-Leninist theory to solve the key problems of the Chinese revolution during the Second Revolutionary Civil War period, such as agrarian revolution, armed struggle, the establishment of base areas, and the building of the Party.

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CONTENTS

I. ONE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY REGIME MAY REPLACE ANOTHER, BUT THE REVOLUTIONARY FLAME CANNOT BE EXTINGUISHED 1

II. THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS OF CHINESE SOCIETY HAVE GIVEN RISE TO TWO KINDS OF POLITICAL POWER WHICH STAND OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER FOR A LONG TIME. THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION, ARMED FORCES, AND REVOLUTIONARY BASE AREAS 30

III. A FLEXIBLE POLICY IS CORRECT; A RIGID POLICY IS WRONG 53

IV. THE BUILDING OF THE PARTY, THE BUILDING OF THE ARMY AND WORK AMONG THE MASSES 73

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 91

I

ONE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY REGIME MAY REPLACE ANOTHER, BUT THE REVOLUTIONARY FLAME CANNOT BE EXTINGUISHED

The Chinese revolution of 1924-27[1] shook the whole world. However, it ended in failure as a result of the betrayal by the Chiang Kai-shek-Wang Ching-wei clique of the Kuomintang and the capitulationism of Chen Tu-hsiu.[2]

In December 1927, Stalin made an appraisal of what this revolution had achieved and pointed out the inevitability of a new revolutionary upsurge. He said:

> Great popular revolutions never achieve final victory in the first round of their battles. They grow and gain strength in the course of flows and ebbs. This

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[1] Generally known as the First Revolutionary Civil War or the Northern Expeditionary War. Under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, in 1924 the Kuomintang adopted a revolutionary policy of alliance with Soviet Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers, and joined hands with the Chinese Communist Party in waging an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolutionary struggle. The revolution failed in 1927 as a result of the betrayal by the Chiang Kai-shek clique of the Kuomintang, and the capitulation of Chen Tu-hsiu within the Communist Party. From then on, the Kuomintang became a counter-revolutionary party representing the interests of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie.

[2] In the last phase of the First Revolutionary Civil War, the Right opportunist view represented in the Chinese Communist Party by Chen Tu-hsiu developed into a capitulationist line.

has been so everywhere, including Russia. So it will be in China.

The most important result of the Chinese revolution is the fact that it has awakened from age-long slumber and has set in motion hundreds of millions of exploited and oppressed people, has utterly exposed the counter-revolutionary character of the cliques of generals, has torn the mask from the faces of the Kuomintang servitors of counter-revolution, has raised the prestige of the Communist Party among the masses of the common people, has raised the movement as a whole to a higher stage and has roused new hope in the hearts of the millions of the oppressed classes in India, Indonesia, etc. Only the blind and the faint-hearted can doubt that the Chinese workers and peasants are moving towards a new revolutionary upsurge.[1]

History has verified Stalin's scientific judgment and brilliant foresight. Mao Tse-tung, applying the theory of Marxism-Leninism and developing the teachings of Lenin and Stalin concerning revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries, guided the members of the Party in leading the Chinese revolution out of the most difficult situations and on to a new path of resurgence.

While co-operating with the Kuomintang, the Right opportunists relinquished the Party's leadership among the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie, and especially among the armed forces, thus causing the defeat of the War. At an emergency conference of the Central Committee held in August 1927, Chen Tu-hsiu was removed from his post as General Secretary of the Party. Later, he took a counter-revolutionary stand by joining the trotskyites and was expelled from the Party.

[1] J. V. Stalin, "The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.)", *Works*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, Vol. X, p. 290.

For many times during the last century, revolution reverted to counter-revolution in China. The biggest reversion took place in 1927 when, one after another, the Kuomintang leaders betrayed the revolution. The realignment of class relations arising afterwards was more intricate and complicated than ever before.

Kuomintang leaders and their accomplices massacred revolutionary workers, peasants and intellectuals; they replaced the old rule of the Northern warlords[1] with their own. But after all, what class (or classes) did their regime represent? Was there any difference between their regime and that of the Northern warlords? If there was, was it one of substance or form? If it was of substance, was it complete or partial? Our Party had to answer these questions because they underlay its policies. Correct answers to these questions would smash the fallacious arguments of all the counter-revolutionaries, including the trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu and his followers. Mao Tse-tung answered these questions at the Second Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area in October 1928:

> The present regime of the new warlords of the Kuomintang remains a regime of the comprador class in the cities and the landlord class in the countryside; it is a regime which has capitulated to imperialism in its foreign relations and which at home has replaced the old warlords with new ones, subjecting the working class and the peasantry to an even more ruthless

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[1] The warlords who represented the interests of the feudal-comprador class in China from the Revolution of 1911 till the Kuomintang came to power.

economic exploitation and political oppression. The bourgeois-democratic revolution which started in Kwangtung Province had gone only halfway when the comprador and landlord classes usurped the leadership and immediately shifted it on to the road of counter-revolution; throughout the country the workers, the peasants, the other sections of the common people, and even the bourgeoisie [by this term Mao Tse-tung means the national bourgeoisie — *author*], have remained under counter-revolutionary rule and obtained not the slightest particle of political or economic emancipation.[1]

Mao Tse-tung described the Kuomintang regime as a new warlord regime — in other words, a counter-revolutionary military dictatorship. The rule of the Northern warlords was also a counter-revolutionary military dictatorship, but the Kuomintang regime is a new form of counter-revolutionary military dictatorship. It is new because it is enforced by a new type of Kuomintang warlords and not by the old type of Northern warlords. What then is the difference between the new and old types of warlords? The difference lies in the fact that prior to the establishment of their counter-revolutionary military dictatorship, the new type of warlords had, to a certain extent, participated in the revolution, had at one time fought under the revolutionary banner against the old warlords, and consequently, they had some influence among the masses. Although this influence began to vanish steadily after they had turned against the

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China?", *Selected Works*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 63.

revolution, the new warlords have still been able to use it for a certain period to deceive the people, as a subsidiary measure to their counter-revolutionary rule of sheer military terrorism. But the greatest difference between the new and old types of warlords lies in the fact that the former have a centralized organization in the form of a political party as well as various subsidiary organizations to use as tools of counter-revolution. This political party was once a revolutionary party, a revolutionary alliance of various classes. The new warlords, however, usurped the leadership of the party and carried out counter-revolutionary activities in its name, thus turning it into a counter-revolutionary party. The warlords of the old type did not have such a political party to use as a handy tool for their counter-revolutionary activities.

The regime of the new warlords represents certain social classes. According to Mao Tse-tung, it "remains a regime of the comprador class in the cities and the landlord class in the countryside". By "remains" he means that the classes represented by the new warlords are basically the same as those represented by the old. But after going through a big revolutionary storm, the big compradors and big landlords found it impossible to continue ruling in the old way; they needed a new form of rule. The counter-revolutionary coup d'etat of April 12, 1927[1] was their initial move to establish such a

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[1] This refers to the coup d'état in Shanghai staged by the Kuomintang reactionaries, headed by Chiang Kai-shek and instigated by the imperialists, which resulted in the massacring of a large number of Communists, revolutionary intellectuals and workers.

regime, with the imperialists actually issuing orders behind the scenes. Some representatives of the national bourgeoisie who opposed the people joined the counter-revolution and became comprador capitalists themselves, now representing the interest of that class. The regime of the new warlords is a new form of counter-revolutionary military dictatorship of the big compradors and big landlords. It was formed with the Shanghai, or the "Kiangsu-Chekiang", gangster ring of comprador-financiers as its core. The Shanghai gangster leaders publicly appeared on the political stage and became "important figures in the party and government" directing the nation's political and financial affairs. Compradors, gangsters, warlords and party toughs interchanged positions in finance and politics and combined to form a unique comprador-gangster administration. Such was the peculiar type of political regime which emerged in semi-colonial and semi-feudal China after the failure of the revolution in 1927. In the initial period of this new dictatorship of the big compradors and big landlords, some of their new representatives who had once represented the national bourgeoisie were able to hoodwink the people for a time. Moreover, a few persons who had obvious connections with the national bourgeoisie or its political representatives were picked out and given dummy posts in the government. This was the reward given to the national bourgeoisie for its part in the counter-revolution, but these puppets were soon kicked out.

Since such a counter-revolutionary dictatorship was the work of the imperialists, it was inevitable that it

should capitulate to imperialism. For instance, when the imperialists bombarded Nanking[1] they received an apology, salutation and indemnity from Chiang Kai-shek's Nanking government. When the Japanese imperialists massacred the people of Tsinan,[2] they met with no resistance, and Chiang Kai-shek's government issued a special decree ordering the protection of "Japanese nationals" in China. Staging a comeback to China with the help of the new warlord regime and reinstating themselves in the positions they had enjoyed before the Great Revolution of 1924-27, the imperialists went a step further to plan new adventures. The September 18 Incident[3] which led to the occupation of northeastern China by the Japanese imperialists occurred soon afterwards.

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[1] On March 24, 1927, when the Northern Expeditionary Army occupied Nanking, the United States, British, Japanese, French and Italian imperialists directly intervened in the Chinese revolution. The warships of these imperialist powers, anchored off Nanking, were ordered to bombard the city, with the result that more than two thousand Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed or wounded.

[2] In 1928, Chiang Kai-shek, supported by Anglo-American imperialism, advanced with his armed forces into northern China. In order to check the spread of Anglo-American influence northward, Japan dispatched its troops to occupy Tsinan, capital of Shantung Province, thereby cutting off the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. On May 3, the Japanese invaders massacred a large number of Chinese in Tsinan.

[3] On September 18, 1931, Shenyang (Mukden) was seized by Japanese troops stationed in northeastern China. On Chiang Kai-shek's order of "absolute non-resistance", the Chinese army in Shenyang and elsewhere withdrew to northern China. This enabled Japanese troops rapidly to occupy the northeastern provinces.

Such a dictatorship, a new counter-revolutionary military dictatorship, certainly is not "a victory for the bourgeoisie", as the renegade-trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu clique claimed. It protects only the interests of foreign imperialism, and those of the compradors in the cities and the landlords in the countryside. The workers, peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie have been denied the freedoms and democratic rights which they achieved through struggle during the revolutionary period of 1924-27, and also gradually deprived of their hard-won economic gains. Furthermore, the national bourgeoisie has failed to attain the political status or win the economic rights to which they aspire.

This process is best explained by facts.

Let us first see the condition of the working class after the failure of the revolution in 1927.

In the preface to the *Second Chinese Labour Yearbook,* edited by the Peiping Institute of Social Survey sponsored by liberal bourgeois scholars, the condition of the working class during the four years from 1928 to 1931 is described as follows:

> These four years may be considered as a period in which Chinese labour fell completely under the control and direction of the Kuomintang. The dissolution on April 12, 1927, of the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions marked the beginning of this period.
>
> . . . Generally speaking, these four years of Kuomintang rule do not appear to have produced any positive effect on Chinese labour [meaning that it did not help the workers — *author*]. . . . The initiative of the workers has been trampled upon, and trade unions

not recognized by the Kuomintang have been either dissolved or reorganized. Government-managed trade unions naturally have no vitality. . . . Those in leading positions have only selfish designs. . . . Such government-managed trade unions have thus become a scourge of society. . . . Cleavages within the Kuomintang not infrequently give rise to conflicts in the party-controlled trade unions. In short, it may be said that the labour movement in China in these four years fell into a state of inactivity. . . . There is no denying that open trade union activities have been greatly restricted and interfered with.

The passages quoted above are couched in moderate terms, but they reveal the glaring difference in the position of the working class under the rule of the new Kuomintang warlords from its position prior to the Kuomintang's counter-revolutionary coup d'etat in 1927.

In his *Problems of the Chinese Trade Union Movement* written in 1930, Chu Chiu-pai[1] gave the following brief account of the workers' wages during the Great Revolution and after its failure in 1927.

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[1] One of the veteran members and leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. He served as Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party from the autumn of 1927 to the summer of 1928. After 1931, he co-operated with Lu Hsun in carrying on a revolutionary cultural movement in Shanghai. In 1933, he went to the revolutionary base area in Kiangsi and served as Commissioner of People's Education in the Central Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government. When the main forces of the Red Army started on their Long March, he remained in the Kiangsi base area to carry on his work. In March 1935, he was captured by Kuomintang police in the guerrilla area in Fukien Province and died a martyr's death in Changting, Fukien, on June 18 of the same year.

Since the banning of the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions (after the April 12 coup d'etat), the wages of Shanghai workers have been cut, particularly in the textile industry. Less than 20 per cent of the workers of Wuhan, including bank employees, continued to receive the same wages as during the "Communist Period", while over 80 per cent received cuts. After the Canton uprising,[1] the capitalist owners of all enterprises in that city enforced a reduction of wages. For instance, the wages of workers in the oil-pressing industry were reduced three times in succession.

Such is the impact of the new Kuomintang warlord rule on the working class. Let us now look at the condition of the peasants under this regime.

I am not going to dwell upon the ruthlessness with which the new Kuomintang warlords attacked the peasants' revolutionary movement. Their very rule was taking shape in the process of an unprecedentedly brutal campaign against the workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals. I shall only make a brief comparison of the condition of the peasants under the rule of the new Kuomintang warlords with that under the rule of the old warlords. The land surtax gives a good example for comparison. The following figures for 1927 and 1928 are taken from *Report on Investigations into Land Surtax*:

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[1] In December 1927, the workers and revolutionary soldiers in Canton jointly staged an uprising and set up a people's regime. They fought stubbornly against the counter-revolutionary troops backed by imperialism, and failed because the enemy was too strong.

	1927 (*in yuan*)	1928 (*in yuan*)
Liyang County, Kiangsu Province:		
Tax	9.10	9.10
Surtax	9.675	9.911
Ihsing County, Kiangsu Province:		
Tax	6.00	6.00
Surtax	3.646	14.79
Nantung County, Kiangsu Province:		
Tax	3.85	4.10
Surtax	5.896	11.103
Chinhua County, Chekiang Province:		
Tax (first harvest)	1.80	1.80
Surtax (first harvest)	1.124	1.454
Sungyang County, Chekiang Province:		
Tax	5.10	5.10
Surtax	4.092	4.194

The 1927 and 1928 figures are taken because these two years represent the dividing line between the rule of the old warlords and that of the new. They fully reveal the greater oppression by reactionary rule and the heavier burden borne by the peasants under the new warlords.

In short, the peasants' suffering has increased everywhere in the Kuomintang-occupied areas. The figures given above relate only to the first years of the new Kuomintang warlord regime. Thereafter, the figures rose year by year. For example, by 1933, the surtax in Nantung County was more than six times the amount of the regular tax. In the same year, in many places in Kiangsu Province which were under the direct control of the new warlord Chiang Kai-shek, the surtax was from eleven to twenty-seven times that of the regular tax: in Kaoyu and Funing, the corresponding figure was 12 times; in Huaiyin, 13 times; in Lienshui, 15 times; in Jukao and Chungming, 17 times; and in Haimen, more than 27 times. In Hunan Province, it

was from 11 to 31 times; in Szechuan, land tax was collected in advance up to and even beyond 1971.

Such ruthless extortion by the new Kuomintang warlords has inevitably led to a further reduction in the acreage of arable land and to a further increase in the area of waste land. This is illustrated by the following figures concerning arable land:

Year	Area *(in mou)*
1914	1,578,347,925
1915	1,442,333,638
1916	1,509,975,461
1917	1,365,186,100
1918	1,314,472,190

(The figures above are taken from the statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Peking, published in the "China Yearbook".)

1928	1,248,781,000

(From the statistics of the Directorate-General of the Budget, Accounts and Statistics of the Kuomintang government, 1928.)

Waste land:

Year	Area *(in mou)*
1914	358,235,867
1915	404,369,947
1916	390,363,021
1917	924,583,899
1918	848,935,748
1922	896,316,784

(The above figures are based on the statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Peking.)

1930	1,177,340,261

(From the statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Nanking, 1930.)

The data show the rapid decline of agricultural production in China under the Kuomintang rule.

Now let us see how the urban petty bourgeoisie has fared. Leaving aside the petty-bourgeois intellectuals

and students who are subjected to unprecedented ideological repression, we shall deal only with the conditions of the handicraftsmen and small merchants.

Under the old warlord regime, there were brokerage, pawnshop and butchery taxes, all of which were equivalent to a business tax. No direct business tax was imposed, although in isolated instances provincial authorities imposed such a tax temporarily. Under the rule of the new Kuomintang warlords, however, a business tax has been imposed on the pretext that *likin*[1] was abolished. The brokerage, pawnshop and butchery taxes have been consolidated into this single tax which extorts much more than the old warlords did. I have taken a few examples from *The History of Finance of the Chinese Republic, Supplementary Volume,* published by the Commercial Press, on the estimated revenue of some provinces from brokerage, pawnshop and butchery taxes in 1925 and from the business tax in 1931 (figures for 1927 and 1928 are not available, hence no comparison can be made for these two years):

Province	Revenue		Increase in 1931 (1925=100)
	1925	1931	
Kiangsu	887,800 yuan	4,900,000 yuan	552
Anhwei	364,800 „	1,635,000 „	448
Chekiang	355,000 „	4,577,468 „	1,289
Hupeh	373,027 „	3,046,000 „	817

[1] A provincial tax at inland stations on articles in transit.

These figures show that in the short period from the establishment of the new Kuomintang warlord rule to 1931 and during a depression in the home market, the urban petty bourgeoisie was compelled to shoulder a burden from four to more than twelve times the amount they had borne under the old warlords, and that only in respect to the business tax. If miscellaneous taxes and levies are added, the burden is still heavier. Take, for example, the estimated revenue in two provinces from miscellaneous taxes and levies:

Province	Revenue		Increase in 1931 (1925=100)
	1925	1931	
Kiangsi	109,388 yuan	583,500 yuan	536
Hupeh	654,641 „	1,033,200 „	158

Of course, the burden of miscellaneous taxes and duties or the business tax did not fall completely on the businessmen but was often shifted onto the general consumers. Yet it is very clear that such burdens greatly hampered the development of petty-bourgeois business enterprises or even hastened their bankruptcy.

Finally, let us look at the condition of the national bourgeoisie under the rule of the new warlords.

Take, for example, the textile industry. *The Shun Pao Yearbook for 1934* published the following data on the year-to-year development of the textile industry operated by national bourgeois capital and by foreign capital:

Number of Spindles *(in thousands)*

Year	Spindles in Chinese Textile Mills	Spindles in Japanese Textile Mills	Total Number of Spindles in China	Percentage of Chinese Mills
1925	2,049	1,332	3,570	57.4
1927	2,099	1,383	3,685	56.9
1928	2,182	1,515	3,850	56.7
1929	2,386	1,652	4,201	56.8
1930	2,499	1,821	4,498	55.6
1931	2,730	2,003	4,904	55.7
1932	2,910	2,096	5,189	56.1
1933	2,773	—	5,200	53.3

Number of Looms

Year	Looms in Chinese Textile Mills	Looms in Japanese Textile Mills	Total Number of Looms in China	Percentage of Chinese Mills
1925	13,371	7,205	22,924	58.3
1927	13,459	13,981	29,788	45.2
1928	16,787	10,896	29,582	56.7
1930	15,955	11,467	29,322	54.4
1931	20,599	19,306	42,596	48.4
1932	21,559	18,289	42,739	50.4
1933	19,081	—	39,564	48.2

The above figures show that after the establishment of the new Kuomintang warlord rule, the percentage of spindles and looms owned by the Chinese national bourgeoisie declined. In other words, foreign capital in China outstripped Chinese capital. In 1928-29, the Kuomintang government's so-called "customs autonomy" actually accorded still greater advantages to foreign capital. A reactionary historian, Chen Kung-lu, states in his *A Modern History of China*:

> As a result of the establishment of customs autonomy and increase of customs duties . . . foreigners set up more factories in the treaty ports because the treaties provided for the payment of equal taxes for the products of both Chinese and foreign factories.

Thus, powerful foreign capital, particularly Japanese, rapidly overwhelmed and replaced Chinese capital. The China Cultural Reconstruction Association, a Kuomintang government organization, in its book *China in the Last Ten Years* had to admit that "during the seven or eight years since the establishment of the National Government in Nanking in 1927, new Chinese enterprises with a capital investment exceeding one million yuan are extremely rare".

The historical data cited above exemplify Mao Tse-tung's statement that the regime of the new Kuomintang warlords is "subjecting the working class and the peasantry to an even more ruthless economic exploitation and political oppression".

Again, as he said:

> . . . throughout the country the workers, the peasants, the other sections of the common people, and

even the bourgeoisie, have remained under counter-revolutionary rule and obtained not the slightest particle of political or economic emancipation.

And also:

> Because the proletariat failed to exercise firm leadership in the revolution of 1926-27 which started from Kwangtung and spread towards the Yangtse River, leadership was seized by the comprador and landlord classes and the revolution was replaced by counter-revolution. The bourgeois-democratic revolution thus met with a temporary defeat. This defeat was a heavy blow to the Chinese proletariat and peasantry and also a blow to the Chinese bourgeoisie (but not to the comprador and landlord classes).[1]

Obviously, the assertion by the trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu clique that the establishment of Kuomintang rule was "a victory for the bourgeoisie" was intended only to cover up the real nature of the counter-revolutionary regime of the comprador and landlord classes. The assertions of these despicable counter-revolutionary apologists have been refuted by historical facts.

Consequently, as Mao Tse-tung wrote, "China is in urgent need of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and this revolution can be completed only under the leadership of the proletariat."[2]

And again:

> According to the directives of the Communist International and the Central Committee of our Party,

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China?", *Selected Works,* FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 64.
[2] *Ibid.*

the content of China's democratic revolution consists in overthrowing the rule of imperialism and its warlord tools in China so as to complete the national revolution, and in carrying out the agrarian revolution so as to eliminate the feudal exploitation of the peasants by the landlord class.[1]

And as stated in "The Decisions of the Sixth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army":

> Only in this way can the socialist future of the Chinese revolution be envisaged. If we should refuse to recognize the necessity of the democratic stage of the revolution and claim that the Chinese revolution has already reached the threshold of socialist revolution, then we would be entertaining an erroneous view extremely harmful to the Chinese revolution. The struggles we have waged confirm the correctness of the opinion of the International.

Obviously, the trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu clique refused to recognize this bourgeois-democratic revolution merely because they wished to help imperialism, the comprador and landlord classes prolong their counter-revolutionary rule. Their so-called "proletarian revolution" was only a pretext for opposing the revolutionary proletariat and the masses of the people under its leadership; it was only an anti-Communist trump-card kept in Chiang Kai-shek's strongbox. On this question too, the facts of history have refuted these counter-revolutionary apologists.

* * *

[1] *Ibid.*

The defeat of the revolution in 1927 caused a temporary recession in the tide of the Chinese revolution. In November 1928, Mao Tse-tung said in his report to the Party's Central Committee: "In the past year we have fought in many places and are keenly aware that the revolutionary tide is on the ebb in the country as a whole."[1] A similar opinion was expressed at the Sixth Party Congress: "The first upsurge of the workers' and peasants' movement is over. . . . Generally speaking, in the present situation there is no popular revolutionary upsurge." Such an estimate was correct and necessary. If such a situation had been overlooked or if an incorrect appraisal had been made, grave errors would have been committed, such as had in fact been committed by certain putschists.

Let us now study the labour movement. In *The Strikes in Shanghai in the Last Fifteen Years*, an official publication published in Shanghai in 1933, conditions after the Kuomintang counter-revolutionary coup are described as follows:

> . . . The two general strikes which marked the climax in the labour movement were followed by a lull of several months. Between May and August 1927, there were only four or five disputes each month. . . .
>
> Labour-capital conflict again became sharp towards the end of 1927. . . . In form, however, the disputes were much less intense than in the preceding year. In 1927, there were 117 disputes. . . . In 1928, there were 118 strikes and close-downs [more than in 1927

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 97.

because in 1927 the labour movement was subjected to extremely savage suppression after the Kuomintang's counter-revolutionary coup d'etat — *author*]. In 1929 the number of strikes dropped to 108 and in 1930 to 87. Although the number decreased year by year, the actual decrease was not great.

While the above facts show that the tide of the labour movement was receding, they indicate that it was impossible for the regime of the comprador and landlord classes to suppress the labour movement for long. At this juncture, however, the revived labour movement was defensive in nature. An official publication published in Shanghai in 1934 entitled *Five Years of Labour-Capital Disputes in Shanghai* states:

1. The number of disputes in which labour gained complete victory had decreased year by year. By percentage, in 1928, it was 41.35 of the total number of disputes; in 1929, 20.12; in 1930, 18.58; in 1931, 19.45; and in 1932, 17.00.

2. The number of disputes in which labour suffered defeat had been gradually increasing. Again, by percentage in 1928, it was only 10.55 of the total number of disputes; in 1929, 11.24; in 1930, 14.16; in 1931, 17.59; but in 1932, it decreased to 10.67.

The official reports of the counter-revolutionary government called this "a change in the relative influence of labour and capital". From our point of view, it meant a change from the offensive to the defensive in the struggle of the working class, and the period in which the workers remained on the defensive was rather long. History has shown that in the controversy on this ques-

tion between Liu Shao-chi and the followers of Li Li-san's line[1] and the third "Left" opportunist line,[2] Liu Shao-chi was right and his opponents were wrong.

With regard to the struggle in the rural areas, the Sixth Party Congress had this to say: "The development of peasant guerrilla war is characterized by the fact that

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[1] This refers to the "Left" opportunist line represented by Li Li-san, who headed the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for some time after June 1930. The adherents of Li Li-san's line denied the need to build up the people's strength for the revolution and refused to recognize the unevenness in the development of the Chinese revolution. They called for the seizure of key cities through country-wide uprisings and opposed Mao Tse-tung's view that over a long period the Party should employ its main forces to create base areas in the villages, using the villages to encircle the cities, and finally to win country-wide victory.

[2] After the failure of the revolution in 1927, on three occasions a "Left" deviation dominated the Party leadership. The first "Left" opportunist line held its sway from the winter of 1927 to the spring of 1928. Its followers incorrectly concluded that the tide of the revolution at that time was still on the upswing and refused to admit its defeat; they opposed retreat and wanted to continue the offensive, thus causing the revolutionary force left after the failure of 1927 to suffer further losses. The second "Left" line was Li Li-san's line. The rule of the third "Left" line lasted from January 1931 to January 1935. At that time certain leading comrades in the Party Centre who had no experience in actual revolutionary struggle put forward a new political programme which in one way or another continued, restored and developed in a fresh form Li Li-san's line as well as other "Left" ideas and policies, and directly opposed Mao Tse-tung's correct line. The disastrous results of this third "Left" line were the loss of about ninety per cent of the strength of the Chinese Communist Party, of the Chinese Red Army and of the Red Army bases, and the subjection of tens of millions of people in the revolutionary bases to persecution by the Kuomintang. This seriously retarded the progress of the Chinese revolution. Later, through long years of reflection and in practical work, however, most of the comrades who had committed "Left" errors, realized and rectified their mistakes.

it broke out here and died out there, and that it is still in a loosely organized and scattered state." Mao Tse-tung's report to the Central Committee of the Party contained a similar statement, which it is not necessary to dwell upon here.

The recession in the revolutionary tide did not mean that "the revolution is dead" as the trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu clique maliciously asserted. The status of the different classes under Kuomintang rule after the defeat of the revolution, as described above, not only proved that the new Kuomintang warlords' regime is a new form of rule of the comprador and landlord classes, and that the Chinese revolution remains bourgeois-democratic in character, but also proved that the foundations of this counter-revolutionary rule are extremely weak and unstable. True, the comprador and landlord classes had, with the support of imperialism and thanks to the ruthless schemes and savage massacres perpetrated by Chiang Kai-shek's clique, inflicted a temporary defeat on the revolution, but, as was correctly stated at the Sixth Party Congress, "None of the contradictions which have given rise to the revolution has yet been resolved." Therefore, the basis for the development of the revolution was still deep and solid. In a letter to a comrade, Mao Tse-tung made a profound analysis of this problem as follows:

1. Although the subjective forces of the revolution in China are now weak, so also are all organizations (organs of political power, armed forces, political parties, etc.) of the reactionary ruling classes, resting as they do on the backward and fragile social and economic structure of China. This helps to explain

why revolution cannot break out at once in the countries of Western Europe where, although the subjective forces of revolution are now perhaps somewhat stronger than in China, the forces of the reactionary ruling classes are many times stronger. In China the revolution will undoubtedly move towards a high tide more rapidly, for although the subjective forces of the revolution at present are weak, the forces of the counter-revolution are relatively weak too.

2. The subjective forces of the revolution have indeed been greatly weakened since the defeat of the revolution in 1927. The remaining forces are very small and those comrades who judge by appearances alone naturally feel pessimistic. But if we judge by essentials, it is quite another story. Here we can apply the old Chinese saying, "A single spark can start a prairie fire." In other words, our forces, although small at present, will grow very rapidly. In the conditions prevailing in China, their growth is not only possible but indeed inevitable, as the May 30th Movement and the Great Revolution which followed have fully proved. When we look at a thing, we must examine its essence and treat its appearance merely as an usher at the threshold, and once we cross the threshold, we must grasp the essence of the thing; this is the only reliable and scientific method of analysis.[1]

Mao Tse-tung criticized some comrades who suffered from revolutionary impetuosity, because they unduly overestimated the subjective forces of the revolution and

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 119.

underestimated the strength of the counter-revolution. He pointed out that such an appraisal stemmed mainly from subjectivism; in the end, it would undoubtedly lead to the erroneous path of putschism. He also disagreed with those who underestimated the subjective forces of the revolution and overestimated the strength of the counter-revolution. He pointed out that this would also constitute an improper appraisal, which would inevitably produce bad results of another kind.

As to the question "whether there will soon be a revolutionary high tide in China", Mao Tse-tung was of the opinion that it "can be decided only by making a detailed examination to ascertain whether the contradictions leading to a revolutionary high tide are really developing".[1]

How did Mao Tse-tung study the development of these contradictions? He wrote:

> Since contradictions are developing in the world between the imperialist countries, between the imperialist countries and their colonies, and between the imperialists and the proletariat in their own countries, there is an intensified need for the imperialists to contend for the domination of China. While the imperialist contention over China becomes more intense, both the contradiction between imperialism and the whole Chinese nation and the contradictions among the imperialists themselves develop simultaneously on Chinese soil, thereby creating the tangled warfare which is expanding and intensifying daily and giving rise to the continuous development of the contradictions among

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

the different cliques of China's reactionary rulers. In the wake of the contradictions among the reactionary ruling cliques — the tangled warfare among the warlords — comes heavier taxation, which steadily sharpens the contradiction between the broad masses of taxpayers and the reactionary rulers. In the wake of the contradiction between imperialism and China's national industry comes the failure of the Chinese industrialists to obtain concessions from the imperialists, which sharpens the contradiction between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the Chinese working class, with the Chinese capitalists trying to find a way out by frantically exploiting the workers and with the workers resisting. In the wake of imperialist commercial aggression, Chinese merchant-capitalist extortions, heavier government taxation, etc., comes the deepening of the contradiction between the landlord class and the peasantry, that is, exploitation through rent and usury is aggravated and the hatred of the peasants for the landlords grows. Because of the pressure of foreign goods, the exhaustion of the purchasing power of the worker and peasant masses, and the increase in government taxation, more and more dealers in Chinese-made goods and independent producers are being driven into bankruptcy. Because the reactionary government, though short of provisions and funds, endlessly expands its armies and thus constantly extends the warfare, the masses of soldiers are in a constant state of privation. Because of the growth in government taxation, the rise in rent and interest demanded by the landlords and the daily spread of the disasters of war, there are famine and banditry everywhere and the peasant masses and the

urban poor can hardly keep alive. Because the schools have no money, many students fear that their education may be interrupted; because production is backward, many graduates have no hope of employment. Once we understand all these contradictions, we shall see in what a desperate situation, in what a chaotic state, China finds herself. We shall also see that the high tide of revolution against the imperialists, the warlords and the landlords is inevitable, and will come very soon.[1]

The above statement written by Mao Tse-tung in January 1930 gives a vivid and fairly complete picture of the situation during the ten-year civil war period following the failure of the revolution in 1927. In this statement he described the contradictions in semi-colonial and semi-feudal China: the contradictions between imperialism and the Chinese nation, among the imperialist powers in their scramble for China, among the counter-revolutionary ruling classes, between the rulers and the broad masses of the ruled (the taxpayers, including the workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie), between the landlords and the peasantry, between the bourgeoisie and the working class, between the warlords and their troops, and between the counter-revolutionary regime and the intellectuals and students. Of course, Mao Tse-tung did not credit all these contradictions with the same importance, nor did he isolate one from another. He perceived their inter-relations and inter-actions; he perceived how the contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation (characteristic of semi-colonial

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 120-21.

China) precipitated or influenced the development of the other contradictions.

In a China ruled by the comprador and landlord classes, there is no way to mitigate the sharpness of the many contradictions described above, and much less the possibility of resolving any of them. Consequently, the rivalry among the ruling classes will intensify day by day, and the revolutionary flame can never be extinguished.

In October 1928, when Chiang Kai-shek and his gang were celebrating the so-called "unification" of China after the capture of Peking, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that much bigger wars between the warlords were imminent:

> Before their capture of Peking and Tientsin, the four cliques of the new Kuomintang warlords, Chiang Kai-shek, the Kwangsi warlords, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan,[1] formed a temporary alliance against Chang Tso-lin. As soon as these cities were captured, this alliance broke up, giving way to bitter struggle among the four cliques, and now a war is brewing between the Chiang and the Kwangsi cliques. The contradictions and struggles among the cliques of warlords in China reflect the contradictions and struggles among the imperialist powers. Hence, as long as China is divided among the imperialist powers, the various cliques of warlords cannot under any circumstances come to terms, and whatever compromises

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[1] These four cliques of warlords fought together against Chang Tso-lin, head of the Fengtien clique of warlords and one-time ruler of China's Northeast, and occupied Peking and Tientsin in June 1928.

they may reach will only be temporary. A temporary compromise today engenders a bigger war tomorrow.[1]

In the spring of 1929, a few months after Mao Tse-tung had made this prediction, a war broke out between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords,[2] thus starting a series of wars among the warlords, which lasted longer and were on a much larger scale than at any time after the rule of the Northern warlords.

History has mercilessly exposed the ignominious counter-revolutionary activities of the trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu clique, in spite of their desperate efforts to help the comprador and landlord classes, on whose behalf they shouted themselves hoarse. While lauding the Nanking government's "unification" of China, acclaiming the tangled wars between the new warlords and the counter-revolutionary wars which they launched as "wars of unification", the Chen Tu-hsiu clique venomously cursed the revolutionary policy and the revolutionary movements of the Chinese Communist Party. History has proved that under the rule of the new Kuomintang warlords (the new counter-revolutionary military dictatorship), the unification of China is impossible. The Kuomintang counter-revolutionary rule cannot possibly give the people any real political rights. Therefore, the people's revolutionary struggle cannot possibly stop. The slogan of the trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu clique calling for the convening of the "National Assembly" was a counter-revolutionary slogan, pure and

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China?", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, pp. 63-64.

[2] The war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, in March-April 1929.

simple. The valiant Chinese people have adopted the revolutionary policy of the Chinese Communist Party, the revolutionary policy of Mao Tse-tung. The formulation of this policy is nothing but the result of an accurate Marxist-Leninist appraisal of the concrete conditions of Chinese society.

II

THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS OF CHINESE SOCIETY HAVE GIVEN RISE TO TWO KINDS OF POLITICAL POWER WHICH STAND OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER FOR A LONG TIME. THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION, ARMED FORCES, AND REVOLUTIONARY BASE AREAS

According to Mao Tse-tung's analysis of the actual conditions of Chinese society, China is "economically backward . . . semi-colonial and under indirect imperialist rule" and is characterized by "a localized agricultural economy (not a unified capitalist economy)". From a political viewpoint, as a result of this type of economy and "the imperialist policy of marking off spheres of influence in order to divide and exploit", the situation is that ". . . since the first year of the Republic (1912), the various cliques of old and new warlords have waged incessant wars against one another, supported by imperialism from abroad and by the comprador and landlord classes at home". Mao Tse-tung calls this peculiar political condition "a feature of semi-colonial China". He states, "Such a phenomenon is to be found in none of the imperialist countries nor for that matter in any colony under direct imperialist rule, but only in a country like China which is under indirect imperialist

rule."[1] Basing himself on this analysis, he describes the condition of the revolution in such terms as the revolutionary forces of the worker-peasant alliance are like "a single spark which can start a prairie fire", and at the same time he describes the condition of the counter-revolution in such terms as the comprador and feudal classes are unable to consolidate their rule.

First, let us discuss the basis for the development of the revolutionary forces in China.

Alongside the economic development of modern China there have emerged two new classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Since the May Fourth Movement,[2] the Chinese proletariat has become an extremely powerful force in the political struggle. It is politically powerful, and extremely powerful, because it is highly centralized. China's economy is very backward and there are only a few modern industries. These few, however, show a high degree of concentration. They are concen-

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[1] All the quotations in this paragraph are taken from *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 65.

[2] The patriotic movement which started with a demonstration by the students of Peking on May 4, 1919, to protest against Japanese imperialist aggression against China, the imperialist-dominated Versailles Peace Conference and the treachery of the warlord regime in China. Subsequently it developed into a mass movement in which the students, workers and businessmen throughout the country went on strike. It speeded up the development of the New Culture Movement which chiefly aimed at opposition to the old ethics and promotion of the new, opposition to the old literature and promotion of the new. Influenced by the Great October Socialist Revolution, the New Culture Movement was impregnated with socialist tendencies. Both in ideology and in matters of cadres, the May Fourth Movement prepared the way for the founding of the Communist Party of China in 1921.

trated in a few big cities, and their production is, to a large extent, centred in big enterprises. For instance, prior to the War of Resistance Against Japan, between one-half and two-thirds of China's modern industries were situated in Shanghai. According to a rough estimate based on the 1934 figures (Source statistical material is incomplete as no data are available for a few industrial branches.), in Shanghai alone, the number of workers in Chinese and foreign-owned factories each employing 500 or more workers constituted 57 per cent of the total number of industrial workers in the country. The concentration is therefore considerable.

In *The Foundations of Leninism,* Stalin wrote:

> . . . The unprecedented concentration of Russian industry on the eve of the revolution. It is known, for instance, that in Russia 54 per cent of all the workers were employed in enterprises employing over 500 workers each, whereas in so highly developed a country as the United States of America no more than 33 per cent of all the workers were employed in such enterprises. It scarcely needs proof that this circumstance alone, in view of the existence of a revolutionary party like the Party of the Bolsheviks, transformed the working class of Russia into an immense force in the political life of the country.[1]

These words of Stalin also apply to China. China has a great concentration of modern industrial workers, and a Communist Party that is armed with Marxism-Lenin-

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[1] J. V. Stalin, *Works,* FLPH, Moscow, 1953, Vol. VI, pp. 131-32.

ism. Furthermore, in this era of world proletarian revolution, China has a friendly neighbour in the powerful socialist Soviet Union, which towers like a mountain of strength in the world. In these circumstances, the Chinese proletariat has grown into the most powerful political force in the country.

Nevertheless, the concentration of modern industries is only one of the many aspects of modern China's economic life. Shanghai, after all, is an exceptional case in China, as its industries are unusually concentrated and dominated by foreign capital (foreign capital constitutes two-thirds of the total capital of all the enterprises). This is characteristic of a semi-colonial economy.

China is still an agricultural country. Generally speaking, the development of modern industries in China, just before and after the revolution of 1924-27, was slower than in Russia before the Russian Revolution of 1905. The *History of the C.P.S.U. (B.)* says:

> . . . By the end of that decade [the 1890's] the number of workers employed in the large mills and factories, in the mining industry and on the railways amounted in the 50 European provinces of Russia alone to 2,207,000, and in the whole of Russia to 2,792,000 persons.[1]

According to statistics for 1933 and 1934, the number of workers in big factories and mines and on the railways in China, excluding the three northeastern provinces, totalled only about 940,000. (The *China Economic Year-*

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[1] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course,* FLPH, Moscow, 1951, p. 18.

book for 1935 gave the following figures: factory workers — 658,178; miners — 200,743; railway workers — 81,448.) Compared with the number of workers in European Russia in the 1890's, the ratio was 3:7. China was much more backward than Russia.

Comparing the total industrial and agricultural population, China was also behind Russia in the years before 1905. Using the data in Lenin's great work *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* as a basis for calculation, we see that the agricultural population of Russia at that time constituted 77.2 per cent; the industrial and commercial population, 17.3 per cent; the unproductive population, 5.5 per cent.[1] In China, according to Mao Tse-tung's analysis of the composition of the population in the 10th district of Hsingkuo County, Kiangsi Province, the figures are as follows: landlords, 1 per cent (about 2 or 3 per cent if the landlords living in other districts or in the county town were included); rich peasants, 5 per cent; middle peasants, 20 per cent; poor peasants, 60 per cent; farm labourers, 1 per cent; handicraftsmen, 7 per cent; small traders, 3 per cent; and vagabonds, 2 per cent. In other words, the agricultural population constituted 86 per cent; the industrial and commercial population, 10 per cent; the unproductive population, 4 per cent. Although these statistics were only for one locality, they were representative of the country as a whole. There are as yet no complete data for the whole country. According to the estimates of the Kuomintang Ministry of Industry for 1932 (*China Eco-*

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[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works,* FLPH, Moscow, 1960, Vol. III, p. 503.

nomic Yearbook, Supplementary Volume) the agricultural population constituted 79 per cent; according to the estimates of *China Yearbook,* English edition, for 1934, it was 80 per cent; the figure, according to the *Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China* for 1935, was 87 per cent. From a rough estimate based on the data available in various provinces, we see that the percentage of the agricultural population differed from place to place, being 75 per cent at the lowest and 98.5 per cent at the highest, and averaging a little over 88 per cent. These figures show that the percentage of the agricultural population in China was higher than that in Russia before 1905.

In respect to the development of capitalism in agriculture, we can also see that China lagged behind Russia in the years before 1905. Lenin wrote in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia,* when discussing the statistics on the rural economy of the 49 European provinces in Russia:

> . . . If a fifth of the households possesses a half of the total number of horses, one may unerringly conclude that no less (and probably more) than half the total peasant agricultural production is in their hands.[1]

We have no comprehensive statistics to hand for our country, but according to the data available regarding cultivated land and the number of draught animals used by peasant households in some districts, we can roughly say that production under the management of landlords and rich peasants accounted for about one-fifth of the total rural production.

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[1] *Ibid.,* p. 144.

Summarizing the various economic conditions described above, we see the following contradiction: on the one hand, with the development of modern industries in China a powerful centralized proletariat has come into being (this proletariat includes workers in the factories owned by foreigners and is far more powerful than the Chinese bourgeoisie); on the other hand, China is not a country in which capitalism is predominant, but is still an economically extremely backward, feudal or semi-feudal agricultural country where the peasants constitute 80-90 per cent of the population. This seems quite contradictory, but is nevertheless a fact. The Chinese Narodniks denied the fact that China had a powerful proletariat and consequently they rejected the leadership of the proletariat over the revolution, and thus became pitiful philistines lagging behind the times. The Chinese trotskyites talked nonsensically about China already being a country in which capitalism was predominant, and denied the fact that the feudal or semi-feudal system in China was the chief form of oppression. Consequently they rejected the peasant revolution, and thus became the most despicable counter-revolutionary underlings.

Following the teachings of Lenin and Stalin, Mao Tse-tung and his comrades-in-arms made a thorough study of the real contradictions in Chinese society, discovered the laws of development of the Chinese revolution, thereby formulating a thoroughgoing revolutionary policy for our Party and engaging in thoroughgoing revolutionary activities.

Since the Chinese proletariat is a powerful centralized class, and its vanguard, the Communist Party of China,

which represents its best interests, is armed with Marxism-Leninism and long steeled in political struggles, the Party is fully able to lead the Chinese revolution forward, and without the leadership of this most revolutionary class and its political party, the Chinese revolution cannot advance even a single step. This is beyond any doubt.

Because China is primarily an agricultural country, the Chinese proletariat and its political party cannot achieve anything in the revolutionary cause if they do not keep constant contact and unite with the peasant masses, to form a solid alliance of workers and peasants. At the same time, as the peasant masses are loosely knit both politically and organizationally, they cannot achieve emancipation unless they clearly see their political objective and organize themselves under the leadership of the proletariat and its political party. This is also beyond any doubt.

Since China is still very backward economically, with agricultural production constituting about 90 per cent and industrial production only about 10 per cent of the gross output value in the whole country, its rural economy is to a great extent independent of the cities. Moreover, as the organized leadership of the proletariat and its political party can, to a certain extent, overcome the difficulties created for the revolution by the small producers' aversion to discipline, the revolutionary movement can be carried on independently for a long time in the rural areas. That, too, is very clear.

As stated above, China's economy has developed unevenly. In this vast country, modern industries have made big strides in some areas where the principal cities

are dominated by the strong economic, political and military power of imperialism, while in most parts of the country, there are only a few or no modern industries.[1] In many remote regions imperialism has not built up direct, dominant economic strength but controls the economy indirectly, while in other remote regions its economic influence is yet very weak or non-existent. This makes it possible for the Chinese revolution, led by the proletariat, to first achieve victory in areas where the enemy's strength is comparatively weak, *i.e.,* in the rural areas. At the same time, because the enemy is stronger than we are, the revolution cannot succeed quickly and will be a long drawn-out affair. This is also beyond doubt.

Let us next discuss the inevitable and endless crises within the Chinese ruling classes. Here we shall relate some historical facts about the struggles among the various warlord cliques after the overthrow of the Ching Dynasty in 1911.

After Yuan Shih-kai, the first chief of the Northern warlords, had usurped the fruits of the 1911 Revolution

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[1] "According to government reports for 1920-30, of the 1,252 factories, two-thirds, or 827 factories, were located in four cities: 645 in Shanghai, 110 in Wusih, 38 in Hankow and 34 in Talien. The remaining one-third were located in other parts of China. . . . The provinces in which most of the modern industries were located were Kiangsu, Liaoning, Hopei, Kwangtung, Shantung and Hupeh. The area of these six provinces constitutes only 10 per cent of the total area of the country while their population makes up only 36 per cent of the whole. In these provinces were concentrated 55 per cent of all the mining enterprises, 93 per cent of the textile mills, 92 per cent of the silk filatures, 86 per cent of the oil presses and 88 per cent of the electric power industry." (*The Chinese Economy*, a Kuomintang periodical published in Nanking before the War of Resistance Against Japan, Vol. I, No. 7.)

with the support of imperialism, outwardly he "unified" the comprador-feudal ruling class. Actually in the South there were still forces opposed to him, namely, the Kuomintang and some warlords associated with it. Moreover, owing to the divide-and-rule policy of imperialism, there were differences within Yuan Shih-kai's own camp, and both open and concealed struggles were waged between Yuan and his subordinates and among the various cliques of his subordinates. After Yuan's death, the rivalries among the Northern warlords, who represented respectively the interests of the various imperialist powers, came into the open. There was rivalry between the Anhwei clique (headed by Tuan Chi-jui and Hsu Shu-cheng) and the Chihli clique (headed by Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-fu), between the Anhwei clique and the Fengtien clique (headed by Chang Tso-lin), and afterwards between the Chihli and the Fengtien cliques. There was also rivalry between factions within the Anhwei, Chihli and Fengtien cliques themselves. . . . In the South, too, because of the direct or indirect machinations of the imperialists, there mushroomed many new cliques which fought each other. In the provinces, small cliques within big ones also struggled against one another. In short, the main rivalry between the South and the North was punctuated by numerous minor rivalries, and the cliques rose and fell in quick succession. After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, *i.e.*, after the new Kuomintang warlords had replaced the old Northern warlords, these transformations became more and more fantastic. One day these new warlords were on intimate terms calling one another "comrade" and "most loyal

comrade", and the next they became enemies, and even "the worst of enemies". One day they were "the worst of enemies", and the next "comrades" again. One day they pledged themselves to the cause of "peace", and the next they started a big war. One day they were in opposition to each other, and the next they swore allegiance.

Therefore, we can well understand that as long as the semi-colonial and semi-feudal economic and political systems in China remain unchanged, hostilities among the warlords cannot possibly end. After their betrayal of the revolution, the Kuomintang leaders and their followers became tools of imperialism, more servile than their predecessors. Far from being able to change one particle of China's semi-colonial and semi-feudal system, they dragged the nation into a new crisis. Consequently, they could not possibly stop armed conflicts among the warlords, which, as Mao Tse-tung had foreseen, turned out to be sharper than ever. Although the ruling classes halted the revolution temporarily, their internal contradictions have become more intense and their conflict of interests are irreconcilable. It is extremely difficult and practically impossible for them to form a complete counter-revolutionary united front capable of lasting any length of time. There is, therefore, no doubt that by relying on the leadership of the proletariat, the people can take full advantage of the struggles between the counter-revolutionary cliques to enable the revolutionary forces to exist and grow.

Thus economics influences politics and revolution is tempered in the course of counter-revolution.

After the failure of the revolution in 1927, the above-mentioned economic and political conditions in China created a situation like that described by Mao Tse-tung in the following:

> While Red political power has been established in a few small areas, in the country as a whole the people lack the ordinary democratic rights, the workers, the peasants and even the bourgeois democrats do not have freedom of speech or assembly, and the worst crime is to join the Communist Party.[1]

This was the basic feature of Chinese politics for a long time after the failure of the revolution in 1927. Mao Tse-tung clearly pointed out this feature and at the same time concluded that Red political power could exist for a long time and develop despite its encirclement by White political power.

Recalling the situation of these years, Mao Tse-tung wrote in his *Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War*:

> We already pointed this out (at the First Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area) when in late 1927 and early 1928, soon after guerrilla warfare was started in China, some comrades in the Chingkang Mountains in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area raised the question, "How long can we keep the Red Flag flying?" For this was a most fundamental question. Without answering this question of whether China's revolutionary base areas and the Chinese Red Army

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 97.

could survive and develop, we could not have advanced a single step.[1]

We have no copy to hand of the decisions of the First Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area, but we have a copy of the decisions of the Second Party Congress of that area. The "most fundamental question" which was settled by the latter decisions was whether or not Red political power could exist for a long time. Lenin said, "The fundamental question of every revolution is the question of power."[2] Mao Tse-tung settled this fundamental question precisely in accordance with the conditions prevailing in China at that time.

The question of the ability of Red political power to exist for a long time amid encirclement by White political power (which reflects the protracted character of the revolution) has three aspects: 1. the agrarian revolution; 2. the armed forces of the people; 3. the building up of revolutionary base areas. The basic social content of the revolution is the agrarian revolution. The leader of the revolution is the proletariat and its political party.

In our semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, the vast majority of the rural population, which constitutes 80-90 per cent of the entire population of the country, either do not own any land or till a piece of land insufficient for their subsistence and in addition are subjected to all kinds of savage economic plunder and political oppression. In his *Investigations in Hsingkuo County* Mao Tse-tung gave the following figures on landownership:

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 196.

[2] See J. V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism", *Works*, FLPH, Moscow, 1953, Vol. VI, p. 112.

Owners	Percentage of Population	Percentage of Land Owned
Landlords	1	40
Ancestral halls (jointly owned by landlords and rich peasants)		10
Rich peasants	5	30
Middle peasants	20	15
Poor peasants	60	5

In other words, the real exploiting classes (landlords and rich peasants) constituting no more than 6 per cent of the population owned 80 per cent of the land; the middle peasants constituting 20 per cent of the population owned only 15 per cent of the land; and the poor peasants constituting 60 per cent of the population owned only 5 per cent of the land. Although conditions in different localities varied somewhat, they were basically the same: the great majority of people owned no land or only a meagre amount of poor land, while a small minority owned large tracts of good land. This was a big contradiction. Mao Tse-tung's data explained exactly what Stalin had pointed out: ". . . feudal survivals are the principal form of oppression in the Chinese provinces."[1] This is one of the two crucial problems of semi-colonial and semi-feudal China (the other being imperialist oppression), and the former is the economic basis of the latter. In other words, imperial-

[1] J. V. Stalin, "The Revolution in China and the Tasks of the Comintern", *Works*, FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. IX, p. 291.

ism is able to oppress China because China is still a semi-feudal agricultural country. Obviously, if the Chinese proletariat does not lead the peasants to rise and end this topsyturvy situation the Chinese nation will not really be able to stand up, eliminate the old system of savage exploitation and oppression, and transform the country from a backward into an advanced one. Mao Tse-tung's *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,* written in 1927, expounded this very point. In the year of 1927 during the downward trend of the revolution and after its defeat, Mao Tse-tung continued to lead our whole Party in an unflinching struggle against the counter-revolution; he led the Party to advance unswervingly, holding aloft the great banner of the peasant revolution — the agrarian revolution — under which the broad masses of peasants began to rally around us.

Nevertheless, without armed forces no agrarian revolution can be carried out effectively. During the revolution of 1924-27, the opportunist Chen Tu-hsiu's surrender of the armed forces resulted in the disastrous failure of the peasant revolution in many places. This was a bitter lesson. Moreover, if the armed forces are not united with the agrarian revolution and if the agrarian revolution is not made the content of an armed struggle, then even with armed forces, nothing can be achieved. The Nanchang Uprising[1] was of great historic

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[1] The armed uprising staged by the Communist Party of China on August 1, 1927 in Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi Province. Led by Chou En-lai, Ho Lung, Yeh Ting, Chu Teh and Liu Po-cheng, more than thirty thousand troops took part in the uprising. It ushered in a new stage in the Chinese revolution as it gave birth to the armed forces of the Chinese people.

significance, but, as some of the troops participating in the uprising did not unite with the agrarian revolution, it unfortunately ended in failure. This was another bitter lesson.

However, even if the armed forces are united with the agrarian revolution, while revolutionary base areas are not built up, then the agrarian revolution still cannot be maintained and consolidated. Without base areas, the armed forces will be compelled to move from one place to another, and find it difficult to unite solidly with the local population. Consequently they will be exposed to the risk of defeat by sudden enemy attacks. This was another of the lessons drawn from the failure of the Nanchang Uprising. Mao Tse-tung, therefore, pointedly emphasized:

> . . . we must take care to lay a solid foundation in the central districts so that we shall have something secure to rely on when the White terror strikes. . . . so as to secure an invincible position. . . .[1]

Such base areas, however, cannot be established unless certain conditions already prevail. These conditions, as Mao Tse-tung has pointed out, are:

> (1) a sound mass base, (2) a sound Party organization, (3) a fairly strong Red Army, (4) terrain favourable to military operations, and (5) economic resources sufficient for sustenance.[2]

According to Mao Tse-tung, the three aspects, the agrarian revolution, the armed forces and the building

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, pp. 73-74.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

up of revolutionary bases — all led by the proletariat — add up to the general concept of "an armed independent regime of workers and peasants",[1] or the concept of establishing Red political power. To form this general concept it is necessary to oppose both putschism and liquidationism, both the outlook of roving rebel bands and localism. We can see that in the course of actual struggles Mao Tse-tung's thought had made a big stride forward as compared with the time he wrote his *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan.*

He summarized the concept of establishing Red political power as follows:

> . . . China is a semi-colonial country for which many imperialist powers are contending. If one clearly understands this, one will understand first why the unusual phenomenon of prolonged and tangled warfare within the ruling classes is only to be found in China, why this warfare is steadily growing fiercer and spreading, and why there has never been a unified regime. Secondly, one will understand the gravity of the peasant problem and hence why rural uprisings have developed on the present country-wide scale. Thirdly, one will understand the correctness of the slogan of workers' and peasants' democratic political power. Fourthly, one will understand another unusual phenomenon, which is also absent outside China, and which follows from the first (that in China alone there is prolonged and tangled warfare within the ruling classes), namely, the existence and development of the Red Army and the guerrilla forces, and together with them, the existence and develop-

[1] *Ibid.*

ment of small Red areas encircled by the White regime. Fifthly, one will understand that in semi-colonial China the establishment and expansion of the Red Army, the guerrilla forces and the Red areas is the highest form of peasant struggle under the leadership of the proletariat, the inevitable outcome of the growth of the semi-colonial peasant struggle, and undoubtedly the most important factor in accelerating the revolutionary high tide throughout the country. And sixthly, one will also understand that the policy which merely calls for roving guerrilla actions cannot accomplish the task of accelerating this nation-wide revolutionary high tide, while the kind of policy adopted by Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung and also by Fang Chih-min[1] is undoubtedly correct — that is, the policy of establishing base areas; of systematically setting up political power; of deepening the agrarian revolution; of expanding the people's armed forces by a comprehensive process of building up first the township Red Guards, then the district Red Guards, then the county Red Guards, then the local Red Army troops, all the way up to the regular Red Army troops; of spreading political power by advancing in a series of waves, etc., etc. Only thus is it possible to build the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, as the Soviet Union has built it throughout

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[1] Chinese statesman and strategist; elected member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1928, founder of the Red area in northeastern Kiangsi and the Tenth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In 1934 he led the Red Army's anti-Japanese advance units northward. In an encounter with the Kuomintang counter-revolutionary army in January 1935, he was taken prisoner and killed in Nanchang in July of the same year.

> the world. Only thus is it possible to create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their foundations and hasten their internal disintegration. Only thus is it really possible to create a Red Army which will become the chief weapon for the great revolution of the future. In short, only thus is it possible to hasten the revolutionary high tide.[1]

Thus the concept of establishing Red political power was created by Mao Tse-tung from an analysis of the concrete conditions existing in China. In other words, his concept means developing the revolution in the rural areas under the leadership of the proletariat, waging a protracted struggle, accumulating strength, encircling the cities, gradually expanding the revolutionary bases and finally achieving the victory of the revolution throughout the country.

This concept of establishing Red political power is also the concept of carrying out a revolutionary armed struggle. This struggle is the peasants' revolutionary armed struggle led by the proletariat and its political party, waged from revolutionary base areas. Stalin said:

> In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counter-revolution. That is one of the specific features and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution.[2]

It is Mao Tse-tung who developed this idea of Stalin in a concrete and practical way. In his *The Struggle in the*

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, pp. 117-18.

[2] J. V. Stalin, "The Prospects of the Revolution in China", *Works*, FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. VIII, p. 379.

Chingkang Mountains, Mao Tse-tung pointed out: "A special characteristic of the revolution in China, a country with a predominantly agricultural economy, is the use of military action to develop insurrection."[1]

At the Sixth Plenary Session of the Party's Sixth Central Committee he said:

> The characteristics of China are that she is not independent and democratic but semi-colonial and semi-feudal, that internally she has no democracy but is under feudal oppression and that in her external relations she has no national independence but is oppressed by imperialism. It follows that we have no parliament to make use of and no legal right to organize the workers to strike. Basically, the task of the Communist Party here is not to go through a long period of legal struggle before launching insurrection and war, and not to seize the big cities first and then occupy the countryside, but the reverse.[2]

These words sum up once again the basic line of the revolution during the ten-year civil war period.

Since protracted armed struggle is a specific feature, and an advantage of the Chinese revolution, our Party does not only need a correct political line, but it also has to have a correct military line before it can lead this revolution forward. Our Party, as represented by Mao Tse-tung, has integrated this firm Marxist political line with a firm Marxist military line. Without a firm Marx-

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 99.

[2] Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. II, p. 220.

ist political line, no firm Marxist military line can be established; and without a firm Marxist military line, no firm Marxist political line can be carried out. The history of our Party shows that those who err politically also err militarily; and military errors invariably spring from political errors, and these in turn lead to more political errors.

In 1927 Stalin pointed out:

> The progress of a revolution must not be regarded as progress along an unbroken ascending line. That is a bookish, not a realistic notion of revolution. A revolution always moves in zigzags, advancing and smashing the old order in some areas, and sustaining partial defeats and retreating in others.[1]

The question about the revolution moving in zigzags as expounded by Stalin, was precisely the basic question concerning the political line and the military line, which our Party had to solve during the ten-year civil war period. It was on this very basic question that, in different periods, our "Left" opportunists erred. The revolution they dreamed of was a revolution which would develop evenly throughout the country and which would achieve nation-wide victory at one stroke. They opposed Mao Tse-tung's views regarding the necessity of patiently carrying out protracted, difficult work and struggle in the rural areas.

As a matter of fact, historical realities completely upset all opinions in opposition to Mao Tse-tung's views about the establishment of a workers' and peasants'

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[1] J. V. Stalin, "Talk with Students of the Sun Yat-sen University", *Works*, FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. IX, p. 265.

armed independent regime in the rural areas where the force of counter-revolution was comparatively weak, with the aim of waging a protracted struggle and achieving victory gradually so as to promote a revolutionary upsurge throughout the country. Chou En-lai correctly stated, "All those who opposed or doubted Comrade Mao Tse-tung's leadership or views have been proved entirely wrong."[1] This is a brief but clear summary of all the past controversies over the Party line. Let us look back at the period of the ten-year civil war. The adherents of Li Li-san's line maintained that "there can never be an independent regime"; that "the idea of using the villages to encircle the cities is completely wrong", and that "it is undoubtedly an utter mistake to think of seizing one or several provinces in order to promote a revolutionary upsurge throughout the country". All these opinions were shattered by realities. The advocates of the third "Left" opportunist line disregarded the actual conditions of the time and, in all fields of Party work, gave priority to the "struggle to capture a few central cities in order to win victory for the revolution first in one or several provinces". They opposed attacking fortified villages, and ridiculed Mao Tse-tung's tactics as "conservatism". These views were also shattered by realities. The followers of Li Li-san's line stood for a general insurrection throughout the country. This waging of a "nation-wide decisive battle" regardless of the balance of forces could be likened to Don Quixote's fight against the windmill. The followers of the third "Left" opportunist line, likewise, believed that the time was ripe for "a life-and-death struggle between

[1] Speech at a reception in Yenan, August 2, 1943.

revolution and counter-revolution" and that "the practice of taking a rest after a victory should not be repeated". They ridiculed Mao Tse-tung's strategy of drawing the enemy deep into our area so as to annihilate him as "a line of retreat". They subsequently advocated "a decisive battle between the road of revolution and the road of colonialism", maintaining that "this question would be solved in a very short historical period". These views, though subjectively aiming at a quick victory of the revolution, meant objectively (when regarded critically on the basis of historical realities) no more than the replacement of one Don Quixote by another, perhaps even more quixotic than the first. There is a saying, "A newborn calf does not recognize a tiger." This means that it has to suffer.

III

A FLEXIBLE POLICY IS CORRECT; A RIGID POLICY IS WRONG

Mao Tse-tung said:

> If only we realize that splits and wars will never cease within the White regime in China, we shall have no doubts about the emergence, survival and daily growth of Red political power.[1]

He added:

> Splits and wars among the warlords weaken the power of the White regime. Thus opportunities are provided for the rise of Red political power in small areas.[2]

This brings up a question of policy.

Mao Tse-tung attributed the existence and development of Red political power, aside from "peculiar reasons" (the economic and political basis of Chinese society) and other conditions, to "another important condition . . . namely, that the Communist Party organization should be strong and its policy correct".[3]

It is obvious that a policy is correct if it is in harmony with actual conditions, and is formulated on the basis of

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 65.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 67.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

their possible development; a policy is wrong if it is not in harmony with actual conditions, and is formulated contrary to their possible development.

Analysing the two different consequences — victory and defeat — of the two different policies, one correct and the other wrong, which were followed in the first stage of the wars waged by the Red Army, Mao Tse-tung wrote:

> An independent regime must vary its strategy against the encircling ruling classes, adopting one strategy when the ruling class regime is temporarily stable and another when it is split up. In a period when the ruling classes are split up, as during the wars between Li Tsung-jen and Tang Sheng-chih in Hunan and Hupeh Provinces and between Chang Fa-kuei and Li Chi-shen in Kwangtung Province, our strategy can be comparatively adventurous and the area carved out by military operations can be comparatively large. However, we must take care to lay a solid foundation in the central districts so that we shall have something secure to rely on when the White terror strikes. In a period when the regime of the ruling classes is comparatively stable, as it was in the southern provinces after April this year [1928 — *author*], our strategy must be one of gradual advance. In such a period, the worst thing in military affairs is to divide our forces for an adventurous advance, and the worst thing in local work (distributing land, establishing political power, expanding the Party and organizing local armed forces) is to scatter our personnel and neglect to lay a solid foundation in the central districts. The defeats which many small Red areas

have suffered have been due either to the absence of the requisite objective conditions or to subjective mistakes in tactics. Mistakes in tactics have been made solely because of failure to distinguish clearly between the two kinds of period, that in which the regime of the ruling classes is temporarily stable and that in which it is split up. In a period of temporary stability, some comrades advocated dividing our forces for an adventurous advance and even proposed leaving the defence of extensive areas to the Red Guards alone, as though oblivious of the fact that the enemy could attack not merely with the landlords' levies but even in concentrated operations with regular troops. In local work, they utterly neglected to lay a solid foundation in the central districts and attempted unrestricted expansion regardless of whether it was within our capacity. If anyone advocated a policy of gradual advance in military operations or a policy of concentrating our effort in local work on laying a solid foundation in the central districts so as to secure an invincible position, they dubbed him a "conservative". Their wrong ideas were the root cause of the defeats sustained last August by the Hunan-Kiangsi border area and by the Fourth Red Army in southern Hunan.[1]

Such is the consequence of an erroneous policy. The consequence of a correct policy is, however, entirely different:

From April onward the independent regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area was confronted with a

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, pp. 73-74.

temporarily stable ruling power in the south, and Hunan and Kiangsi would dispatch at least eight or nine regiments of reactionary forces to "suppress" us and sometimes as many as eighteen. Yet with a force of less than four regiments we fought the enemy for four long months, daily enlarging the territory under our independent regime, deepening the agrarian revolution, extending the people's political power and expanding the Red Army and the Red Guards. This was possible because the policies of the Party organizations (local and army) in the border area were correct. The policies of the Border Area Special Committee (with Mao Tse-tung as secretary) and the Army Committee (with Chen Yi as secretary) of the Party were then as follows:

Struggle resolutely against the enemy, set up political power in the middle section of the Lohsiao mountain range, and oppose flightism.

Deepen the agrarian revolution in areas under the independent regime.

Promote the development of the local Party organization with the help of the army Party organization and promote the development of the local armed forces with the help of the regular army.

Be on the defensive against Hunan with its comparatively strong ruling power, and take the offensive against Kiangsi with its comparatively weak ruling power.

Devote great efforts to the development of Yunghsin, set up an independent regime of the people there and prepare for a prolonged struggle.

Concentrate the Red Army units in order to fight the enemy confronting them when the time is op-

portune, and oppose the division of forces so as to avoid being destroyed one by one.

Adopt the policy of advancing in a series of waves to expand the area under the independent regime, and oppose the policy of expansion by adventurist advance.

Thanks to these proper tactics, to the terrain of the border area which favoured our struggle, and to the inadequate co-ordination between the troops invading from Hunan and those invading from Kiangsi, we were able to win a number of military victories and expand the people's independent regime in the four months from April to July. Although several times stronger than we, the enemy was unable to prevent the expansion of our regime, let alone to destroy it. Our regime tended to exert an evergrowing influence on Hunan and Kiangsi.[1]

Facts thus prove that a correct policy leads the revolution forward in a favourable direction even under adverse conditions, while an erroneous policy only causes damage to the revolution.

The proletarian policy, the Marxist-Leninist principle on tactics, as applied by Mao Tse-tung, is to rely on the masses, secure positions of operation, utilize contradictions and build up our strength. A policy of relatively venturesome advance may be adopted when a split occurs in the political power of the ruling classes; the advance, however, should be made step by step and with bases to support the operation. At times when the political power of the ruling classes is temporarily and relatively stable, a policy of advancing in a series of waves should be adopted and the policy of venturesome advance

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

should be opposed. When faced by a comparatively strong enemy force, we should assume the defensive; when faced by a weaker enemy force, we should assume the offensive. To sum up, the tactical principle is: to rely on the masses, utilize contradictions, enlist the support of the majority, oppose the few and destroy them one by one.

Basing himself on Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung maintains that our policy must change in accordance with the changes in the current situation. It is wrong to adopt one rigid policy for all periods. It is wrong to apply a policy which is practicable and necessary in one period to another period in which it is impracticable and absolutely unsuitable (for instance, "The sole reason for the August defeat was that, failing to realize that the period was one of temporary stability for the ruling classes, some comrades adopted a policy suited to a period of splits within the ruling classes and divided our forces for an adventurous advance on southern Hunan, thus causing defeat both in the border area and in southern Hunan."[1]). It is necessary to clearly distinguish between a period of splits among the ruling classes and one in which they enjoy temporary stability, and the above-mentioned different policies formulated by Mao Tse-tung for the two different periods are, as borne out by facts, absolutely correct. These flexible policies, which are applicable to direct armed struggles with the enemy, are also completely applicable to the revolutionary work and struggles in the areas under Kuomintang rule. As is well known, Mao Tse-tung and many other comrades adopted such flexible policies in the Red Army base

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

areas, which enabled the Red Army's strength to grow "from a single spark into a prairie fire". Nevertheless, the comrades who adhered to the incorrect "Left" line rejected such flexible policies in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, and the Party's work suffered continuous setbacks there. When these comrades moved from the Kuomintang-controlled areas to the Red Army bases, they applied the same rigid policies which they had followed in the Kuomintang areas, and so the Red Army bases suffered serious setbacks.

Mao Tse-tung, pointing out the necessity of relying on the masses and on the alliance of the workers and peasants, lays special emphasis on utilizing all kinds of contradictions to facilitate the development of the revolution. It is possible to utilize contradictions in either of the two different periods he has pointed out. It is entirely wrong to maintain that no contradictions can be utilized in the period when the ruling classes enjoy temporary stability. It is true, as Mao Tse-tung said:

> But fighting among the warlords does not go on every day. Whenever the White regime in one or more provinces enjoys temporary stability, the ruling classes there inevitably combine and do their utmost to destroy Red political power.[1]

Even under such circumstances, Mao Tse-tung still maintains that the counter-revolutionary offensive can be defeated. For instance, the above-mentioned victories in Hunan and Kiangsi between April and July were won under exactly such circumstances. They were won by utilizing the contradictions between the rulers of Hunan

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 67.

and Kiangsi who had combined their forces to attack us, and destroying them one by one. Needless to say, in a period when there is a split among the ruling classes, this can be done even more easily.

The "Left" opportunists were completely mistaken in over-simplifying the contradictions in Chinese society because they were utterly ignorant of actual conditions in China. China is a big semi-colonial, semi-feudal country. The nation is in a serious plight; society is in upheaval; many economic and political phenomena are of a complicated nature; and, as noted above, there are many conflicts within the counter-revolutionary ruling classes. This country is full of contradictions. These incessant conflicts among the ruling classes lead to the continuous rise and fall of their political personalities. It is like a merry-go-round with people gaining and losing power in quick succession. This is common knowledge.

Similar changes have occurred within the ruling classes in the economic field. Statistics compiled in 1935 by Tan Yi-fu relating to the number of old and new landlords in ten counties of Szechuan Province show:

> The new landlords own 90 per cent of the land, and the old landlords 8 per cent; this indicates the rapid decline of the old landlords and the marked rise of the new ones. As to number of households, the new landlords constitute 31 per cent of the total, while the old ones constitute 69 per cent. This means that the new landlords, representing slightly more than 30 per cent of the households, own more than 90 per cent of the land, while the old landlords, representing about 70 per cent of the households, own less than 10 per

> cent of the land. . . . Among the new landlords, warlords and bureaucrats represent the smallest number of households but own most land. There are cases where 1.8 per cent of such households own 30.9 per cent of the land.

It can thus be seen that the rise and fall of political personalities entailed the rise and fall of personalities in the economic field, and that changes in the economic field were reflected in changes in the political field. The above description concerns only Szechuan, but similar conditions existed in many other parts of the country.

Thus from the change in the economic and political status of the different ruling personalities and cliques in China, we see that, guided by their own interests, their relations with counter-revolution and revolution could and did change in different periods.

Following the example set by Mao Tse-tung, we revolutionaries and Communists have to take into account all the political and economic changes which take place among the ruling personalities and cliques in China. We have to consider how to adopt a flexible policy towards them in varying situations and at different periods, and how to utilize the contradictions caused by their own interests, in order to isolate the strongest and fiercest of our enemies and extend the influence of the revolution. During the ten-year civil war, however, our "Left" opportunists acted contrary to Mao Tse-tung's policy of utilizing all kinds of contradictions to our advantage. Making no distinction of Chiang Kai-shek, Kuomintang and non-Kuomintang rulers, their policy was one of trying to overthrow them altogether. This rigid policy was quite unsuited to the complexities of the situation at that

time. In the eyes of the "Left" opportunists, they were all counter-revolutionaries, all enemies, and should, therefore, all be overthrown at the same time. In their opinion, there were no friends but only enemies in the world; and they made no distinction between main and minor enemies, nor between present and future enemies — they were all enemies pure and simple. Again, they considered that there was no one whom they could unite with, or neutralize. All they recognized was a solid opposition. How easy, how simple, and how "brave"! But these "Left" opportunists never defeated any counter-revolution nor overthrew any enemy. Liu Shao-chi put this point very clearly in his essay, *Eradicate Closed-Door Sectarianism and Adventurism*:

> The champions of closed-door sectarianism and adventurism completely fail to understand how to utilize contradictions within the enemy camp, how to take advantage of these contradictions to precipitate an open conflict, how to establish a temporary alliance with elements within the enemy camp who may co-operate with us, or with those who are today not yet our main enemies, so as to oppose the main enemies, weaken the total enemy forces and destroy its alliance against us. Those comrades, who often claim to be "most revolutionary, most thorough", "absolutely uncompromising and unyielding" and wish to overthrow everything, in fact can overthrow nothing.

The "Left" opportunists not only ignored all the contradictions within the ruling classes but also all the contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and the oligarchic rule of the comprador and landlord classes and the important contradiction between the national bour-

geoisie and imperialism. They did not realize that China was a semi-colonial country and that because of imperialist oppression and aggression and because of the contradiction between the national bourgeoisie and the comprador and landlord classes, it was possible that the national bourgeoisie might again change their political attitude under certain conditions in spite of the fact that, in 1927, they took part in the betrayal of the revolution. Some comrades nervously conjured up in their imagination a compact, broad united front against the Chinese revolution and the Communist Party, one that embraced all the imperialist powers, the entire comprador and landlord classes, the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. Even after the "September 18" and "January 28"[1] incidents, when class relations in China began to change, some comrades still regarded all the political parties and factions of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie as "counter-revolutionary parties", as "all types of counter-revolutionary parties", as "being counter-revolutionary alike", and as "the most dangerous enemy", more dangerous than the comprador and landlord classes who were in power. Some comrades, therefore, advocated that "it is necessary to exert the main efforts to attack these compromising counter-revolutionary parties" and to "intensify in particular the struggle against these factions"; they maintained that "it has become more urgent than ever to combat these counter-revolutionary

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[1] On January 28, 1932, Japanese marines attacked Shanghai. The Kuomintang Nineteenth Route Army, then stationed in Shanghai, on its own initiative and against the wishes of the Kuomintang government, resisted the invasion jointly with the people of Shanghai. Due to the betrayal by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, this resistance collapsed.

factions". It is clear that such a view and such a way of doing things could only help the power-wielding comprador and landlord classes.

The "Left" opportunists were even more ridiculous in regard to policy towards the petty bourgeoisie. It is widely known that Mao Tse-tung's proletarian policy attaches great importance to taking the petty bourgeoisie into consideration. He said:

> Only by launching a political and economic struggle for democracy, which will also involve the urban petty bourgeoisie, can we turn the revolution into a seething tide that will surge through the country.[1]

He pointed out that the poor peasants fighting alone presented a very serious problem. In the following passage from *The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains*, he compared the two very different consequences of correct and incorrect policies towards the petty bourgeoisie:

> Up to February this year [1928 — *author*] we applied our policy towards the petty bourgeoisie fairly well. In March the representative of the Southern Hunan Special Committee arrived in Ningkang and criticized us for having leaned to the Right, for having done too little burning and killing, and for having failed to carry out the so-called policy of "turning the petty bourgeois into proletarians and then forcing them into the revolution", whereupon the leadership of the Front Committee was reorganized and the policy was changed. In April, after the whole of our army arrived in the border area, there was still not

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 98.

much burning and killing, but the expropriation of the middle merchants in the towns and the collection of compulsory contributions from the small landlords and rich peasants in the countryside were rigorously enforced. The slogan of "All factories to the workers", put forward by the Southern Hunan Special Committee, was also given wide publicity. This ultra-Left policy of attacking the petty bourgeoisie drove most of them to the side of the landlords, with the result that they put on white ribbons and opposed us. With the gradual change of this policy, the situation has been steadily improving. Good results have been achieved in Suichuan in particular, for the merchants in the county town and other market towns no longer fight shy of us, and quite a few speak well of the Red Army. The fair in Tsaolin (held every three days at noon) attracts some twenty thousand people, an attendance which breaks all previous records. This is proof that our policy is now correct. The landlords imposed very heavy taxes and levies on the people; the Pacification Guards[1] of Suichuan levied five toll charges along the seventy-*li* road from Huangao to Tsaolin, no farm produce being exempt. We crushed the Pacification Guards and abolished these tolls, thus winning the support of all the peasants as well as of the small and middle merchants.[2]

The original policy was correct, then when the "Left" opportunist "envoys" arrived, they made a mess of things. But as soon as we corrected the erroneous policy, we again extended our front.

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[1] A kind of local counter-revolutionary armed force.

[2] Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works,* FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 98.

Mao Tse-tung always tried to avoid fighting with an isolated force, but the "Left" opportunists always tried to create conditions for fighting with isolated forces. They completely forgot and abandoned the brilliant advice given us by Stalin when he refuted the trotskyite renegades in July 1927:

> The question of the allies of the proletariat is one of the main questions of the Chinese revolution. The Chinese proletariat is confronted by powerful enemies. . . .
>
> To smash these powerful enemies requires, apart from everything else, a flexible and well-considered policy on the part of the proletariat, the ability to take advantage of every rift in the camp of its enemies, and the ability to find allies, even if they are vacillating and unstable allies, . . .[1]

Revolutionary practice has proved over and over again that a flexible policy is correct and is of immense advantage to the revolution, that it helps to expand the revolutionary front and hastens its victory. Conversely, a rigid policy is wrong and extremely harmful to the revolution; it narrows the revolutionary front and may lead to its failure. There are different stages in a revolution and its course is tortuous, which not infrequently necessitates a zigzag advance. Marxist-Leninists recognize and take all these elements into account, apply them to practice and base practical policies upon them, and are thus able to guide the revolution and ensure its

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[1] J. V. Stalin, "Notes on Contemporary Themes", *Works*, FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. IX, pp. 345-46.

victory. The Blanquists,[1] however, rejected these things, were unwilling to try and understand them, and discarded them in their activities and policies; consequently, they were unable to guide the revolution, and might even have made the revolution abortive.

Mao Tse-tung knows how to apply Marxism-Leninism in the analysis of various specific conditions, and because of this he has been able to orientate himself correctly and to follow a correct policy in the revolutionary movement. This is revolutionary wisdom. His opinion on the establishment of an armed independent regime of the worker-peasant alliance and on utilizing the gaps in the ruling classes to develop the strength of the revolution is an example of great Marxist-Leninist wisdom. All Chinese revolutionaries and Chinese Communists must strive to achieve such wisdom. According to the fairy tale, *Pilgrimage to the West,* Sun Wu-kung, the monkey king, was captured by Lao-tse and put into the Crucible of the Eight Trigrams to be reduced to ashes by alchemic fire. Sun, however, was able to find a gap in the furnace through which a current of air came. He hid there and thus saved himself from being burned alive. When the crucible was opened, he jumped out and continued his riot in Heaven, starting a revolution against its Emperor. This story is an instance of Sun Wu-kung's supernatural wisdom. At the time of the failure of the revolution in 1927, the counter-revolu-

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[1] Blanquism refers to the ideology of revolutionary adventurism as represented in France by Auguste Blanqui (1805-81). The Blanquists denied class struggle, and imagined that mankind could be delivered from the system of capitalist exploitation not through the class struggle by the proletariat, but through conspiracy by a handful of intellectuals.

tionaries attempted to burn to death all the revolutionaries and Party members, but because our Party was guided by the Marxist-Leninist wisdom of Mao Tse-tung and many other comrades, we saved the revolution and developed it. According to *Pilgrimage to the West,* Sun Wu-kung was finally defeated because his supernatural power proved inadequate. The Marxist-Leninist wisdom of Mao Tse-tung is very different from the wisdom of Sun Wu-kung. Mao Tse-tung's wisdom comes from the fact that he has mastered, and is continuously mastering, the laws of historical and current development, that he relies upon the solid alliance of the workers and peasants and that he has implemented the agrarian revolution. The development of the revolution bears out the fact that guided by this wisdom, our Party and revolution succeeded not only in breaking through the five big counter-revolutionary campaigns of "encirclement and annihilation" in the civil war but also succeeded in gradually bringing the counter-revolutionaries under control.

With Marxist-Leninist wisdom, that is to say, with an understanding of the laws of the development of the revolution, we will be able to foster the growth of the revolutionary forces and turn defeat into victory. Without this wisdom, the revolutionary forces will weaken, and victory turn into defeat.

The Chinese reactionary ruling classes throughout the ages have always resorted to underhand methods and intrigue. We must not forget that in the revolution of 1927 we were defeated by Chiang Kai-shek's brutal intrigues. Communists are likely to fall into a trap and suffer serious losses if they do not have Marxist-Leninist wisdom, if they do not understand the necessity of rely-

ing on the solid worker-peasant alliance, and of carrying out the agrarian revolution and armed revolutionary struggles, if they fail to understand the different concrete links in life and struggle and that the revolution often necessitates a zigzag advance and if they do not apply flexible policies. In 1927, Chen Tu-hsiu was defeated because he did not possess Marxist-Leninist wisdom. During the ten-year civil war, some comrades caused serious setbacks to the revolution because they too did not possess Marxist-Leninist wisdom. To err is bad, but, if we learn from our errors, draw lessons from them, become wiser and do better the next time, then we can turn bad things into good things. We hope that comrades who have committed errors will learn from the lessons of the past.

We should never follow Ah Q's[1] example, because Ah Q's failure was due to his stupidity.

Some comrades argued as follows: if the revolution gains in strength, and the revolutionary forces grow, other people will organize a counter-revolutionary united front to surround us with an iron ring and to attack us; then such a counter-revolutionary united front will be indestructible and therefore it will no longer be necessary to utilize contradictions, since there will be no contradictions to be utilized. Such a view revealed that these comrades saw only one side of the question and did not see the other side. Or, to be exact, they did not even know one side. The fact that the revolution gained

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[1] Hero in *The True Story of Ah Q*, a famous novel written in December 1921 by the great Chinese writer, Lu Hsun. The author fashioned him after the type of people who seek satisfaction in failures and setbacks by regarding them as moral or spiritual victories.

in strength undoubtedly caused a number of people, frightened by the revolution, to unite against us. On the other hand, impressed by the growth of our strength, other people came over to our side. If we were not strong, who would have come over to our side? Moreover, the stronger the revolutionary force, the greater were the vacillations and splits in the counter-revolutionary camp and more people would come over to the side of the revolution.

It is well known that the Communist Party of China is strong. Its strength lies in the working-class movement, in the worker-peasant alliance, and in its leadership of the peasant revolution. The sympathy and assistance consistently given by the powerful socialist Soviet Union to the cause of our national and people's liberation have immensely strengthened the Chinese revolution and the position of the Communist Party of China. The First Great Revolution was launched because Sun Yat-sen had the assistance of the Chinese Communist Party which stood in the forefront of the revolution. This has left an extremely profound impression on the Chinese people. Many people have great respect and admiration for the Chinese Communist Party because of its ability to keep in close touch with the masses and for its courageous spirit of self-sacrifice. Even people in the enemy camp often felt helpless in dealing with the revolutionary forces led by the Chinese Communist Party. The valiant struggles waged by the Party during the ten-year civil war shook the whole country and the world. As a matter of fact, even in the most difficult period of the civil war, people in various walks of life in China always had a strong desire to understand Chinese Communists' attitude and hear what

they had to say. It is more so now, in the seventh year of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Anyone who still thinks that we are isolated must be ignorant since this is entirely contrary to the facts.

Events in the War of Resistance have shown that if the Communist Party of China were not strong it would not have been able to win the co-operation of others in the formation of the anti-Japanese national united front. Since the beginning of the war, it is precisely because we have relied firmly on the masses and because we have courageously resisted and pinned down 58 per cent of the Japanese forces in China and 90 per cent of the puppet troops, that our prestige has been further enhanced and that the majority of people from different classes now look up to us more and more.

It follows that we must seriously think over what Mao Tse-tung repeatedly taught us during the ten-year civil war about a flexible Marxist-Leninist policy and oppose a rigid one. With the worker-peasant alliance as the main bulwark of our revolution and the expansion of the revolutionary strength of the workers and peasants as our basic aim, we must learn how to take full advantage of the contradictions among our enemies and destroy them one by one. We must be boundlessly loyal to the cause of the people's revolution, possess dauntless courage and sufficient wisdom. Such is the road that leads to the victory of the revolution.

Lenin said:

> "Political activity is not the pavement of the Nevsky Prospect" (the clean, broad, smooth pavement of the perfectly straight principal street of St. Petersburg) — N. G. Chernyshevsky, the great Russian Socialist of

> the pre-Marxian period, used to say. Since Chernyshevsky's time Russian revolutionaries have paid the price of numerous sacrifices for ignoring or forgetting this truth. We must strive at all costs to *prevent* the Left Communists and the West-European and American revolutionaries who are devoted to the working class paying *as dearly* for the assimilation of this truth as the backward Russians did.[1]

At times during the ten years of civil war, some of our comrades committed "Left" infantile errors, forgot, on some important questions, the truth so tirelessly taught by Lenin and rejected the flexible policy put forward by Mao Tse-tung. They "paid very dearly" for this. It can be said that after paying thus dearly, many of our comrades now understand this truth. To avoid repeating these errors, however, we must pursue our studies still more conscientiously.

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[1] V. I. Lenin, "'Left-Wing' Communism, an Infantile Disorder", *Selected Works*, FLPH, Moscow, 1952, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 397.

IV

THE BUILDING OF THE PARTY, THE BUILDING OF THE ARMY AND WORK AMONG THE MASSES

In order to carry out revolutionary tasks and implement correct revolutionary policies, it is necessary to build up a good party, a good revolutionary army and carry on work among the masses successfully.

Without a good party, a really Bolshevized party, no good revolutionary army can be built up and work among the masses cannot be carried on successfully. In his work "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party", Mao Tse-tung wrote:

> There are various non-proletarian ideas in the Communist Party organization in the Fourth Red Army which greatly hinder the application of the Party's correct line. Unless these ideas are thoroughly corrected, the Fourth Army cannot possibly shoulder the tasks assigned to it in China's great revolutionary struggle.[1]

The building up of a sound party is, therefore, the key to guide the development of the revolution.

The Party creates revolutionary armed forces; this in turn facilitates the growth of the Party. Therefore, the building of the Party and the building of the army are interrelated tasks.

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 105.

As the aim of the Party, and of the army it leads, is to liberate the people, it is necessary to carry out all kinds of work among the masses successfully and to maintain close contact with them. Therefore, the building of the Party and the army and work among the masses are also interrelated tasks.

To correlate the work of building the Party and the army with work among the masses, and to treat these tasks as an integral whole — this is a positive development, in various fields of work, of the following idea of Stalin: "In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counter-revolution. That is one of the specific features and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution."

Nevertheless, in the revolutionary base areas it was no easy matter to build a good, Bolshevized Communist Party and a revolutionary army led by such a party. The difficulties we encountered there were related to the rural environment, because, after the failure of the 1927 revolution the basic units of the Party organization in the base areas were "composed largely of peasants and other elements of petty-bourgeois origin."[1] As to our army, it is mainly composed of peasants. It is a peasant army led by the proletariat. Mao Tse-tung made an adequate estimate of the difficulties arising from these circumstances. He said:

> The economy in the border area is agricultural, with some places still in the age of the hand-pestle. . . . The unit of social organization everywhere is the clan, consisting of people having the same family name. In the Party organizations in the villages, it often hap-

[1] *Ibid.*

pens that a branch meeting virtually becomes a clan meeting, since branches consist of members bearing the same family name and living close together. In these circumstances it is very hard indeed to build a "militant Bolshevik Party". . . . Localism exists to a serious extent in the relations between counties and even between districts and townships within the same county. In eliminating localism . . . it takes White oppression, which is by no means localized, to do much more. For instance, it is only when counter-revolutionary "joint suppression" campaigns by the two provinces make the people share a common lot in struggle that their localism is gradually broken down. Localism is declining as a result of many such lessons.[1]

Despite all these difficulties, we have been able to build up a truly Bolshevized Communist Party and an army with strict proletarian revolutionary discipline in the militant rural areas. The following are the reasons why this has been possible. Our Party has been founded and developed primarily on the basis of a powerful, centralized industrial proletariat. It has been steeled in the revolution of 1924-27 and acquired rich political and organizational experience. From the very beginning of their political activity, the leaders of our Party and many cadres in important positions, among them Mao Tse-tung and many other comrades, have linked themselves closely with the working class and its struggles and are thoroughly versed in Marxism-Leninism. Furthermore, the Chinese revolution is part of the world proletarian revolution and as such it has been guided by the Com-

[1] Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 93.

munist International — founded by the great Lenin and led by his pupil and successor, the great Stalin — which synthesized the experiences of proletarian and other revolutionary struggles in various countries (having fulfilled its historical mission, the Communist International declared itself dissolved in 1943). We also have the achievements of the socialist Soviet Union as an example and can always refer to and study the experiences gained in actual struggles by the proletariat and their political parties — the Communist Parties of various countries. Besides, as Mao Tse-tung often said, we possess radios, and are never politically isolated even though we live in the countryside. We are in close contact with the political activities of the whole country and the whole world. Although the revolution has been split up into sections in various rural areas, the possession of radio has enabled us to establish centralized leadership.

But the question is how are the Party and the army to be built up and what method is to be used to build them. If these two problems are solved, the question of work among the masses will also be solved.

Stalin said:

> The Party must not be regarded as something isolated from the people who surround it. It lives and works in its environment. It is not surprising that at times unhealthy moods penetrate into the Party from outside.[1]

Since our Party is located in the rural areas, it follows that the narrow-mindedness, aversion to discipline and

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[1] J. V. Stalin, "Report to the Seventeenth Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.)", *Works*, FLPH, Moscow, 1955, Vol. XIII, p. 355.

sectarianism of the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie, vestiges of the old patriarchal system and other unhealthy ideas and habits are apt to penetrate into it. As long as small peasants and the petty bourgeoisie exist around us in great numbers, there is nothing strange in the existence of such phenomena. Likewise, in the past we were surrounded by White political power and the armies of warlords, and at present we are surrounded by the Japanese imperialist army and the Kuomintang troops. Through their constant contact with us, they have been able to influence, to a greater or less degree, certain people within our own ranks. Such a situation is very dangerous if we allow it to drift without trying to stop it and if we allow these vicious things to corrode our Party and the revolutionary armed forces. Therefore, Mao Tse-tung stated emphatically that "the question of proletarian ideological leadership is very important."[1] To solve this problem, at the Kutien Conference[2] he raised the question of ideological remoulding and education within the Party:

> The most urgent problem facing the Party organization in the Red Army is education. To strengthen and expand the Red Army into a force able to wage the struggle, it is necessary first to carry on education within the Party. Unless the political level of the Party is raised, unless deviations within the Party are eradicated, it will certainly be impossible to strengthen and expand the Red Army, much less for it to

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 97.

[2] The Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army called at Kutien, Fukien Province, in December 1929.

shoulder important tasks. So, it is one of the important tasks of the Party to carry on systematic education in the Party and to end the disorganization and drift that existed in the past.

These ideas of Mao Tse-tung's on building the Party are the same as those of Lenin and Stalin. Lenin said:

> The proletariat everywhere is constantly being recruited from the petty bourgeoisie, is everywhere constantly connected with it through thousands of transitional stages, boundaries and gradations. When a workers' party grows very quickly (as ours did in 1905-06) its penetration by a mass of elements imbued with a petty-bourgeois spirit is inevitable. And there is nothing bad about that. The historic task of the proletariat is to assimilate, re-school, re-educate all the elements of the old society that the latter bequeaths it in the shape of offshoots of the petty bourgeoisie. But the proletariat must re-educate these newcomers and influence them, not be influenced by them. Of the "Social-Democrats of the days of freedom", who first became Social-Democrats in the days of enthusiasm and celebration, the days of clarion slogans, the days of proletarian victories which turned the heads of even purely bourgeois intellectuals, very many began to *study in earnest,* to study Marxism and to learn persistent proletarian work — they will always remain Social-Democrats and Marxists. Others did not succeed in gaining, or were incapable of gaining, anything from the proletarian party but a few texts and "striking" slogans learned by heart, a few phrases about "boycottism", "*boyevism*", and so forth. When such elements thought to foist their "theories", their

world outlook, i.e., their short-sighted views, on the workers' party, a split with them became inevitable.[1]

These words of Lenin are of great importance to us in building the Party in our country where the petty bourgeoisie is predominant. The task of the proletariat is to assimilate the large number of elements of petty-bourgeois origin who have joined the Party, re-educate them to be genuine Communists and Marxist-Leninists, and at the same time to expel those elements who are ideologically and politically incorrigible and who attempt to corrode our Party.

As is well known, Stalin had always stressed the importance of Party education. At the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.), Stalin, after enumerating the various existing deviations from the Party line, emphatically pointed out the tasks in the sphere of ideological and political work as follows:

1. To raise the theoretical level of the Party to the proper height.
2. To intensify ideological work in all the organizations of the Party.
3. To carry on unceasing propaganda of Leninism in the ranks of the Party.
4. To train the Party organizations and the non-Party active which surrounds them in the spirit of Leninist internationalism.
5. Not to gloss over, but boldly to criticize the deviations of certain comrades from Marxism-Leninism.

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[1] V. I. Lenin, "The Faction of Supporters of Otzovism and God-Building", *Collected Works*, FLPH, Moscow, 1963, Vol. XVI, pp. 59-60.

6. Systematically to expose the ideology and the remnants of the ideology of trends that are hostile to Leninism.[1]

At the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.), Stalin again stressed the importance of educating Party members and cadres in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and improving the political and theoretical level of the Party and its functionaries. He said: "There is hardly need to dwell on the cardinal importance . . . of the Marxist-Leninist training of our personnel."[2]

We are building our Party in a rural environment. Therefore, it need hardly be explained why it is of the utmost importance to educate and remould our Party members in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism.

In order to build up a genuine Marxist-Leninist party, Mao Tse-tung says it is necessary to oppose and struggle against subjectivism which stems from the narrow-mindedness of the small peasants and petty bourgeoisie. He wrote:

> Subjectivism exists to a serious degree among some Party members, causing great harm to the analysis of the political situation and the guidance of the work. The reason is that subjective analysis of a political situation and subjective guidance of work inevitably result either in opportunism or in putschism. As for subjective criticism, loose and groundless talk or sus-

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[1] J. V. Stalin, "Report to the Seventeenth Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.)", *Works*, FLPH, Moscow, 1955, Vol. XIII, pp. 371-72.

[2] J. V. Stalin, "Report to the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.) on the Work of the Central Committee", *Problems of Leninism*, FLPH, Moscow, 1953, p. 787.

piciousness, such practices inside the Party often breed unprincipled disputes and undermine the Party organization.[1]

Mao Tse-tung proposes the following method for correcting guidance which is contrary to Marxism-Leninism:

> The main method of correction is to educate Party members so that a political and scientific spirit pervades their thinking and their Party life. To this end we must: (1) teach Party members to apply the Marxist-Leninist method in analysing a political situation and appraising the class forces, instead of making a subjective analysis and appraisal; (2) direct the attention of Party members to social and economic investigation and study, so as to determine the tactics of struggle and methods of work, and help comrades to understand that without investigation of actual conditions they will fall into the pit of fantasy and putschism; and (3) in inner-Party criticism, guard against subjectivism, arbitrariness and the vulgarization of criticism; statements should be based on facts and criticism should centre on politics.[2]

Mao Tse-tung points out that we must wage a struggle on two fronts against two forms of subjectivism: on the one hand, against the narrow-minded conservatism of those who are short-sighted and cannot see the future of the revolution and, on the other, against the putschism of those who "disregarding the subjective and objective conditions", "suffer from the malady of revolutionary

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 111.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

impetuosity" and "will not take pains to do minute and detailed work among the masses."[1]

Obviously, if we had not waged a struggle on these two fronts, we would not have been able to build up ideologically a genuine Marxist-Leninist Party. Without such a party, we would not have been able to lead the revolution a single step forward, lead the agrarian revolution, create armed forces and revolutionary base areas, nor would we have achieved the best results possible in these matters.

Next, Mao Tse-tung holds that organizationally the Marxist-Leninist Party which we are building up must be a united party possessing a strict proletarian discipline and a system of democratic centralism. Hence, we must combat all kinds of individualism or cliquism (he also calls it departmentalism and later generalizes it as sectarianism), which are a manifestation, within the Party, of all incorrect ideas ranging from those of the small peasants to those of the bourgeoisie.

Mao Tse-tung points out that the Party must wage struggles on two fronts against the two forms of individualism or cliquism, namely, against extreme democratization and absolute equalitarianism coming from the "Left", and against liberalism coming from the Right. Needless to say, all these deviations violate the Party's principle of democratic centralism, weaken the Party's organization and its fighting capacity.

Obviously, if we had not waged struggles on these two fronts, we would not have been able to build up a party organizationally with strict proletarian discipline. Without such a party, we would not have been able to

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

lead the revolution a single step forward, lead the agrarian revolution, create armed forces and revolutionary base areas, nor would we have achieved the best results possible.

As may be seen from the above, the party which Mao Tse-tung built up in the revolutionary base areas was a revolutionary party guided by Marxism-Leninism and possessing strict centralized proletarian discipline. It naturally follows that an army created by such a party could become the best and the most revolutionary army in China.

Such a revolutionary army was incompatible with warlordism. The principles of building the army discussed at the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army led by Mao Tse-tung (convened in Kutien, Fukien Province) may be summarized as follows: Firstly, this army must recognize that political work guides military work, that the Party leads the army and not vice versa, and that the Party cannot be separated from military work. Secondly, this army must align itself with the masses; it simultaneously fights, carries on propaganda work and organizes the masses; it must not be isolated from the masses nor stand above them. Thirdly, this army must be free from departmentalism and must consider the arming of the local people as one of its important tasks. Fourthly, this army must be different from the Kuomintang army which is used by the officers to monopolize political power. Fifthly, the comrades in charge of military affairs in this army must be different from the officers in the Kuomintang army in which Kuomintang members holding military posts become privileged members of that party. Sixthly, this army must itself be democratic; and so on.

Mao Tse-tung wrote:

> Apart from the role played by the Party, the reason why the Red Army has been able to carry on in spite of such poor material conditions and such frequent engagements is its practice of democracy. The officers do not beat the men; officers and men receive equal treatment; soldiers are free to hold meetings and to speak out; trivial formalities have been done away with; and the accounts are open for all to inspect. The soldiers handle the mess arrangements. . . . All this gives great satisfaction to the soldiers. The newly captured soldiers in particular feel that our army and the Kuomintang army are worlds apart. They feel spiritually liberated, even though material conditions in the Red Army are not equal to those in the White army. The very soldiers who had no courage in the White army yesterday are very brave in the Red Army today; such is the effect of democracy. The Red Army is like a furnace in which all captured soldiers are transmuted the moment they come over. In China the army needs democracy as much as the people do. Democracy in our army is an important weapon for undermining the feudal mercenary army.[1]

This represents an unprecedented revolutionary development in the Chinese army, a great creation of the Communist Party of China, the great creation of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh and the whole body of officers and men of the Red Army. The building of such a revolutionary army in China was started when the Communists were working in the Whampoa Military

[1] Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 83.

Academy[1] and the National Revolutionary Army. Thanks to the work of these Communists, the Northern Expeditionary Army scored brilliant victories. Half-way through the expedition, however, this academy and the command of the National Revolutionary Army were seized by the political and military agents of the comprador and landlord classes. It was only after this that the people's army, a thoroughly revolutionary and democratic army, was actually built up by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh and the whole body of officers and men of the Red Army. Only such an army can do the triple job of fighting, working among the masses and supplying itself, perform numerous miraculous feats and persistently wage the unprecedented, protracted and difficult war of liberation.

Furthermore, this army must oppose the idea of roving rebel bands. In the early days of the Red Army, such an idea did exist in some of its units. It not only hampered the steady expansion of revolutionary ranks then, but now under present conditions in China it may expose them to the danger of being wiped out by the

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[1] The Whampoa Military Academy, located at Whampoa near Canton, was established by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924 with the help of the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union, and jointly run by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. At one time or another Chou En-lai, Yun Tai-ying, Hsiao Chu-nu, Hsiung Hsiung and other comrades did political and other work in the academy. They trained large numbers of cadres in a revolutionary spirit for the revolutionary armed forces; these cadres included many members of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League. However, the head of the academy, Chiang Kai-shek, using his position, pushed aside the Communists, built up his own following and finally, after the counter-revolutionary coup d'état of April 12, 1927, turned the academy into a counter-revolutionary organization.

enemy. Therefore, opposition to this idea presented a very serious task in building up the army at that time.

Analysing this idea of roving rebel bands in the Red Army in its early days, Mao Tse-tung wrote:

> The political ideology of roving rebel bands has emerged in the Red Army because the proportion of vagabond elements is large and because there are great masses of vagabonds in China, especially in the southern provinces. This ideology manifests itself as follows: (1) Some people want to increase our political influence only by means of roving guerrilla actions, but are unwilling to increase it by undertaking the arduous task of building up base areas and establishing the people's political power. (2) In expanding the Red Army, some people follow the line of "hiring men and buying horses" and "recruiting deserters and accepting mutineers", rather than the line of expanding the local Red Guards and the local troops and thus developing the main forces of the Red Army. (3) Some people lack the patience to carry on arduous struggles together with the masses, and only want to go to the big cities to eat and drink to their hearts' content. All these manifestations of the ideology of roving rebels seriously hamper the Red Army in performing its proper tasks; consequently its eradication is an important objective in the ideological struggle within the Red Army Party organization.[1]

He proposed the following methods of rectifying the idea of roving rebel bands:

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party", *Selected Works,* FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 114.

1. Intensify education, criticize incorrect ideas, and eradicate the ideology of roving rebel bands.

2. Intensify education among the basic sections of the Red Army and among recently recruited captives to counter the vagabond outlook.

3. Draw active workers and peasants experienced in struggle into the ranks of the Red Army so as to change its composition.

4. Create new units of the Red Army from among the masses of militant workers and peasants.[1]

Our Party finally overcame the idea of roving rebel bands in the Red Army. Only by succeeding in this and by opposing warlordism was our Party able to persist in carrying out the three closely linked tasks of developing the agrarian revolution, building up the armed forces and establishing revolutionary base areas. The wild dream of all counter-revolutionary elements (imperialists, the Kuomintang reactionaries and trotskyites) who expected us to fail as Li Tse-cheng[2] and Hung Hsiu-chuan[3] had done, was thoroughly shattered.

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] Li Tse-cheng was the leader of a peasant revolt in the last year of the Ming Dynasty (A.D. 1644). Under the slogan of paying no grain taxes he led the peasant forces in campaigning in and out of the provinces of Shensi, Szechuan, Hupeh, Honan, Ningsia, Kansu, Shansi and Hopei. Although he had the support of the peasants and won many victories, he always roamed about the country without establishing a consolidated base area. In 1644, he captured Peking. Shortly afterwards, however, he was defeated by the combined forces of Wu San-kuei, a Ming general, and the Ching army.

[3] Hung Hsiu-chuan was the leader of the great revolutionary peasant war against the Ching Dynasty's feudal rule and national oppression in the middle of the nineteenth century. In January

Nevertheless, whether in building the Party or the army, if we really wish to do good work and accomplish our revolutionary tasks, we must follow a mass line in all fields of work. There is no other way.

Mao Tse-tung pointed out that it was necessary to "arouse the local Party organizations to criticize the Party organizations in the Red Army and the organs of mass political power to criticize the Red Army itself, in order to influence the Party organizations and the officers and men of the Red Army".[1] In other words, we must depend on the criticism of the masses to keep our Party and revolutionary army healthy.

Mao Tse-tung warned us against the danger of estrangement from the masses. He pointed out that the purely military viewpoint of "over-confidence in military strength and absence of confidence in the strength of the masses of the people"[2] is entirely wrong.

1851, Hung Hsiu-chuan and others organized and led an uprising in Kwangsi Province, and established the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. In 1852, the Taiping army fought its way through the provinces of Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Anhwei, captured Nanking in 1853 and made it the Taiping capital. After that, part of the Taiping army was dispatched north and reached the vicinity of Tientsin. The Taiping army, however, failed to establish strong bases in the areas under its occupation. After establishing its capital in Nanking the leaders of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom committed many political and military blunders. Because of this, it could not withstand the combined assaults of the counter-revolutionary Ching army and the British, American and French aggressors. After defeat, in 1864, Hung Hsiu-chuan committed suicide.

[1] Mao Tse-tung, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 108.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

In January 1943, Jen Pi-shih,[1] in a speech delivered at the Conference of Senior Cadres in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, dealt with the question of the Party's unified leadership and the question of opposing tendencies towards warlordism and bureaucratism. He stressed the necessity of following the mass line in all these matters. He pointed out that in order to oppose all that is evil and to encourage what is good, "the only way is to develop criticism and supervision of the Party by all its members, and of the government by the broad working masses. Such criticism and supervision by the masses should be used as an important weapon to correct tendencies towards bureaucratism and warlordism, corruption and decadence, other incorrect ideological tendencies and an attitude of indifference towards these tendencies."

The mass line is the key to activating all kinds of work; it is also the key to Mao Tse-tung's correct leadership of the Chinese revolution. With this key, we can have a good Party, a good army, and can do good work among the masses. Then, we shall be able to handle all our work well, overcome all our difficulties and no counter-revolutionary will be able to hinder us.

Here, we should also discuss the attitude of Communists towards revolutionary struggles and various kinds of work. As is well known, Lenin and Stalin constantly taught Communists not to be conceited with victory or dejected with defeat. Stalin specifically taught

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[1] Chinese statesman and member of the Party's Central Committee from 1927 onwards. He was elected to the Political Bureau of the Party's Central Committee in 1931, and in 1945 was again elected a member of the Political Bureau and of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. He died in Peking in October 1950.

us not to become dizzy with success. At the Kutien Conference, Mao Tse-tung also raised this question. He reprimanded some Party members severely for becoming "conceited when a battle is won and dispirited when a battle is lost."[1] The cause of the Chinese revolution is a great cause; the cause of communism is also a great cause. Our task is immense; our path of advance is tortuous; we Communists must strive "to improve ourselves day by day, again and again", as the Chinese saying goes. If we become conceited when we win a few battles and dispirited when we lose some, then our efforts will become slack and our progress cut short. Consequently, we shall not be able to lead the masses forward and will be forsaken by them. Thus, whether or not we Communists march forward with the masses depends on how well, in our practical activities, we carry out the instructions of Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung who teach us not to become conceited with victory or dispirited with defeat.

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 107.

V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The spread of Marxism-Leninism and the birth of the Communist Party in China following the Great October Socialist Revolution gave, as Mao Tse-tung said, "an entirely new complexion to the Chinese revolution".[1] The first outstanding achievement of the Chinese Communist Party was that, standing in the van of all classes and parties in the country, it put forward a political programme against imperialism, feudalism and warlords and created a united front of the national-democratic revolution, thus paving the way for the First Great Revolution. Comparing this great revolution of 1924-27 (the revolution launched after the birth of the Communist Party of China and led by it) with the Revolution of 1911 (the revolution that broke out before the birth of the Communist Party and was led by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois political parties only), we see that although they were only separated by a short period, they differed vastly in scale and strength, in the form of struggle, and in the extent and depth to which the people were enlightened.

True, in 1927 the revolution failed. Our Party lost a battle at that time. The failure was due to the betrayal and sudden attack made on us by Chiang Kai-shek's

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "Reform Our Study", *Selected Works*, FLP, Peking, Vol. III, 1965, p. 18.

Kuomintang, an attack which caught the young Party and proletariat mentally unprepared, and also, to the opportunist leadership of Chen Tu-hsiu which presented Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang with the opportunity to carry out its betrayal and sudden attack and offered a big advantage to the counter-revolutionary conspirators. The defeat suffered by our Party, just like a defeat suffered by an army, unavoidably caused some confusion within its ranks. In the revolutionary period of 1927, the chief opportunist leaders like Chen Tu-hsiu and Peng Shu-chih became counter-revolutionary trotskyites, advocated an alliance with reaction and became the most despicable hirelings of imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionaries. There were also a number of renegades who surrendered and sold themselves to the Kuomintang individually, turned against the Communist Party and committed crimes by betraying the Party and the proletariat. Other careerists became pessimistic, avoided the struggle and withdrew from the Party; they only went with the tide, coming in when the revolution was on the upsurge and deserting when it was in difficulties; these people were simple time-servers. Others withdrew from the Party but still wanted to work for the revolution. Feeling that the Communist Party had become much too "red", they thought they might be able to win over the masses if they put up something new (but they achieved the opposite because their breaking away from the Communist Party meant their severance from the masses). They were also opportunist in their thinking. Later, however, some of them returned to the Party; some maintained friendly relations with it, while others became hostile towards it. The great majority of those who remained in the Party, willing to carry on

the fight, were the cream and mainstay of the Party. But, some displayed a tendency towards putschism. We agree that many of the comrades who committed this error cherished good intentions towards the revolution and were enthusiastic revolutionaries, but, in general, they reflected the influence of petty-bourgeois impetuosity. They substituted their subjective idealism for Marxist materialism. They did not know how to accumulate strength by working hard among the masses and how to apply flexible revolutionary policies. Some of them, not being sure of their objective, fought blindly. Though they had admirable intentions, in actual practice they suffered complete failure and could not advance the revolutionary cause.

The Sixth Party Congress deserves credit for overcoming the ideological confusion arising in the Party then from the failure of the revolution. That congress charted out the course of the revolution; it affirmed that the revolution was still bourgeois-democratic in character and condemned the trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu clique. It pointed out that only under the leadership of the proletariat could the Chinese revolution succeed. By so doing, the congress united the Party and overcame the crisis created by renegades and deserters. Then it pointed out that the first upsurge of the revolution was over, and that, as none of the tasks of the revolution had been fulfilled, a new revolutionary upsurge was bound to come. Stressing that the Party was passing through a period between two revolutionary upsurges, the congress stated that the Party's general line was to win over the masses. Thus, it overcame the inactivity of some Party members and also pointed out that putschism and commandism were the most dangerous deviations within the Party.

As is widely known, however, the Sixth Party Congress had its shortcomings, which I shall not dwell upon here. Applying the methods and theory of Marxism-Leninism and following and developing Stalin's teachings concerning the Chinese revolution, Mao Tse-tung solved, in a more comprehensive way, the basic problems of the revolution at that time. It was Mao Tse-tung and the many comrades rallying round him who, during the period following the failure of the revolution of 1927 and before and after the Sixth Congress, stood in the vanguard of the Party, fully retained their Marxist-Leninist clear-mindedness and never lost their bearings; it was they who opposed both opportunism and putschism and became the revolutionary guides of the whole Party.

Lenin said: "The revolutionary parties must complete their education. . . . victory is impossible unless they have learned both how to attack and how to retreat properly."[1] This is a great revolutionary truth. To be well-versed in such knowledge, it is necessary to study the various characteristics of the socio-economic structure and political movements of a nation and to show adequate courage both in theory and practice. As we have seen from Mao Tse-tung's *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan* and from his practical activities, he proved to be fully capable of guiding the advance of the revolution during the revolutionary period of 1924-27. He clearly pointed out the direction of advance, particularly at important junctures in the development of the revolution (that is, he realized not only the necessity of advancing but also how to

[1] V. I. Lenin, "'Left-Wing' Communism, an Infantile Disorder", *Selected Works*, FLPH, Moscow, 1952, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 349.

advance). Chen Tu-hsiu and other opportunists rejected such a line of action and led the revolution to defeat. When in 1927 the revolution failed, the Party forces directly led by Mao Tse-tung retreated in the best planned and most orderly way, and during the retreat, at different stages, these forces selected the best positions to hold on to. Consequently, they suffered the least losses (that is, he knew not only the necessity of retreating but also how to retreat). Apart from this, Mao Tse-tung, taking into account the characteristics of Chinese society, succeeded in correctly combining retreat with advance even after the failure of the revolution in 1927. In other words, he led the revolutionary forces in retreat, and tried to turn the retreat into an advance; from one point of view it was a retreat and from another an advance. Mao Tse-tung selected a definite rural area as a central position in the retreat, an area where the counter-revolutionary forces were relatively weak and torn by many contradictions, and where conditions were favourable for the revolutionary forces to menoeuvre and accumulate strength. The march towards the Chingkang Mountains is one of the best-known marches in the revolutionary history of the world. From the beginning this march was both a retreat and the beginning of a new advance. It was significant because besides contributing directly to the preservation of the retreating forces, it provided cover for the retreat of the revolution throughout the country by making itself the biggest target in the struggle waged against the revolution by the counter-revolutionaries. This retreat was also the beginning of a new advance. That is to say, although in 1927 the failure of the revolution forced us to retreat from the big cities, by armed force we established inde-

pendent regimes in the rural districts; while the revolution lost the cities, it gained the villages. The revolution changed the direction of its advance — it went to the rural areas where the counter-revolutionary forces were relatively weak, contradictions were more numerous and the revolution was well-entrenched. This advance rested on a more solid class basis. The immediate aim of the advance was to overthrow the imperialist stooges — the Kuomintang which had betrayed the revolution, and the feudal landlord class. The advance manifested itself in the agrarian revolution, armed struggle, and the building up of revolutionary base areas. This advance, therefore, went one step further than the Northern Expedition. When dark counter-revolutionary terror swept the country, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh and many other comrades around them, as well as the many comrades in different places who had followed Mao Tse-tung's lead, actually represented our whole Party. They led our comrades and the revolutionary workers, peasants and soldiers to carry on the revolutionary achievements of 1924-27 and issued the order for an offensive against the counter-revolution. This brought new hope to the whole nation. It was a most daring, soberly planned and executed offensive. Although the offensive was a difficult, local one and was launched in a series of waves, it was nevertheless a well-aimed, fatal blow delivered against the enemy and later became the great motive force which promoted a new revolutionary upsurge throughout the country. This offensive, according to Mao Tse-tung, started as "a single spark" and later spread like "a prairie fire".

Mao Tse-tung has always stressed the paramount importance of theory and policies in relation to revolu-

tionary practice. As we have noted in the foregoing pages, he recalled in his *Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War,* that if we had not answered the fundamental question of "How long can we keep the Red Flag flying?" in the early stages of the war waged by the Red Army, we would not have been able to advance a single step. Again, as mentioned above, he has always stressed that the correctness of the policies of the Communist Party is "an important condition" for the existence and development of the revolutionary forces. It is true that "without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement". In the light of the practice of the Chinese revolution and the experience of Mao Tse-tung, these words of Lenin are highly instructive. Mao Tse-tung is a faithful pupil of the revolutionary teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. His teachings are characterized by unity of theory and practice and by his ability to integrate Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution, thus concretely illustrating the laws of the development of the revolution in China. It follows, therefore, that the Chinese revolution under his leadership is bound to overcome difficulties and be victorious.

Since the founding of our Party, the valiant struggles and sacrifices made by all comrades in the Party have been most praiseworthy and inspiring, and they are becoming more so as time goes on. There have been outstanding statesmen such as Li Ta-chao,[1] Chen Yen-

[1] One of the earliest propagandists of Marxism-Leninism in China, a founder and veteran leader of the Communist Party of China. He was arrested and murdered by the warlord Chang Tso-lin in April 1927.

nien,[1] Chao Shih-yen[2] and Lo Yi-nung,[3] and brilliant leaders of the masses such as Su Chao-cheng,[4] Peng Pai,[5] Liu Hua,[6] Wang Shou-hua,[7] Fang Chih-min[8] and Teng

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[1] Veteran member and one of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, he was elected member of the Central Committee at the Party's Fifth National Congress in 1927. In June 1927 he was arrested and killed in Shanghai.

[2] Chinese Communist leader of the early working-class movement and one of the leaders of the three armed uprisings staged by Shanghai workers from the winter of 1926 to the spring of 1927. In July 1927 he was arrested and killed in Shanghai.

[3] Chinese Communist leader in the early working-class movement and one of the leaders of the three armed uprisings staged by Shanghai workers from the winter of 1926 to the spring of 1927. He was elected member of the Central Committee at the Party's Fifth National Congress. In April 1928 he was arrested and killed in Shanghai.

[4] Chinese Communist leader in the early working-class movement and one of the organizers and leaders of the Hongkong seamen's strike in 1922 and of the Canton-Hongkong general strike in 1925. In 1927 he was elected member of the Central Committee and alternate member of the Political Bureau. In 1928 he was elected member of the Political Bureau. He died in Shanghai in January 1929.

[5] Chinese Communist leader of the early peasant movement and founder of the revolutionary regime in Haifeng and Lufeng in Kwangtung Province. He was elected member of the Central Committee in 1927 and member of the Political Bureau in 1928. He was arrested and killed by the Kuomintang in Shanghai in 1929.

[6] Well-known Chinese Communist organizer of the working-class movement and one of the leaders of the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions in 1925. In November 1925 he was arrested and killed by the warlord Sun Chuan-fang.

[7] Well-known Chinese Communist organizer of the working-class movement, and Chairman of the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions in 1925. He was killed during Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary coup d'état of April 12, 1927.

[8] See footnote on p. 47.

Chung-hsia.[1] All these comrades who were prominent fighters during the revolutionary period of 1924-27, laid down their lives for the cause of communism. Many distinguished propagandists of Marxism-Leninism such as Chu Chiu-pai,[2] Yun Tai-ying,[3] Hsiao Chu-nu[4] and Tsai Ho-shen,[5] who waged many important struggles

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[1] Chinese Communist leader of the early working-class movement. In 1922 he headed the Chinese Trade Union Secretariat which was the central organ through which the Communist Party of China led the working-class movement. From 1922 he served as a member of the Central Committee of the Party. In 1928 he was chosen as representative of the All-China Federation of Labour to the Red Trade Union International which elected him member of its Executive Committee at its Fourth Congress. After his return from Moscow in 1930, he served as political commissar of the Second Corps of the Red Army in the Hunan and western-Hupeh revolutionary base area. In 1933 he was arrested in Shanghai and was killed in Nanking in the same year.

[2] See footnote on p. 9.

[3] Chinese Communist leader and propagandist in the early youth movement. He headed the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League in 1923 and was elected member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at its Fifth National Congress. In the spring of 1930, he was arrested and killed in Shanghai.

[4] Chinese Communist propagandist in the early period and one of the editors of *Chinese Youth,* organ of the Chinese Communist Youth League. In 1924 he was a political instructor of the Whampoa Military Academy. In April 1927 he was killed during the counter-revolutionary coup d'état of the Kwangtung warlords.

[5] Chinese Communist propagandist in the early period. At the Second National Congress of the Party he was elected member of the Central Committee and at the Fifth National Congress became a member of the Political Bureau. In 1931 he was sent to Hongkong as a representative of the Party Centre to direct Party work in Kwangtung Province. He was later arrested by the Hongkong authorities and turned over to the reactionary Kuomintang government in Kwangtung. In 1932 he was secretly murdered.

and brought immortal glory to our Party and the Chinese people, also died for the cause of communism. Nevertheless, since the founding of our Party, it is Mao Tse-tung who had correctly applied Marxism-Leninism, continued the work of Stalin in dealing with the theoretical questions of the Chinese revolution, concretely analysed Chinese society, pointed out the specific laws of the development of the Chinese revolution, and consistently given correct leadership to the Chinese revolution in its advance. It is from the works of Mao Tse-tung that we can see the unity between Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution. Hence, if we wish to study the history of the Chinese revolution, and study our Party line, we should seriously study the works of Mao Tse-tung.

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